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et al.: The Use of OSHA in Products Liability Suits Against the Manufactu

NOTES
THE USE OF OSHA IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY
SUITS AGAINST THE MANUFACTURERS OF
INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY
INTRODUCTION

Until recently, the sole action of an industrial worker injured by
machinery has been against his employer. Workmen's compensation acts, in effect in all states, impose upon many employers a
form of strict liability for factory injuries.' These statutes make
recovery for the worker considerably easier than it was at the
common law, since the employer cannot raise defenses relating to
the employee's contributory negligence or assumption of risk.2 In
return for the facility of this compensation, the employee is barred
from asserting any further claims against his employer based on
non-statutory grounds. 3 In addition, the amount of recovery is
usually more limited than that which a jury might award. 4 While lost
wages are recoverable by the worker, damages relating to the
permanent nature of the injury are limited by statutory ceilings
which may be inadequate. Furthermore, pain and suffering often
must remain uncompensated under workmen's compensation. 5
Although there has been no reform in many states' workmen's
compensation laws, the growing body of products liability law has
opened a new route to the compensation of factory workers.6 If a
dangerous machine caused the injury, and such danger can be
traced to the machinery's manufacturer, the worker may now sue
this "third-party" manufacturer directly in tort.7 Such suits have
1.

See generally IND. CODE §§ 22-3-2-1 et seq. (1971).

2. Id. § 22-3-2-10.
3. Id. § 22-3-2-6.
4.

W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 531 (4th ed. 1972) [hereinafter

cited as PROSSER]. The scope and limits of remedies for particular injuries available
under Indiana law may be found in IND. CODE §§ 22-3-3-1 et seq. (1971).
5. See generally Mitchell, Products Liability, Workmen's Compensation and
the IndustrialAccident, 14 DuQ. L. REV. 349 (1976). This article reviews the history of
industrial accident compensation and discusses workmen's compensation ceilings, the
subrogation of the employer to employee's claim against the third-party manufacturer
after a successful products suit, and some of the key problems of policy involved here.
6. An excellent practice manual for this developing area of law is L. FRUMER
& M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1970) [hereinafter cited as FRUMER& FRIEDMAN].

7. "A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the
market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a
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become very prevalent in recent years, especially since the Restatement of Torts has recognized the strict liability of the sellers of
unreasonably dangerous products to ultimate consumers. 8 Under
defect that causes injury to a human being." Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal.
2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900 (1962). The purpose of this doctrine is to "insure that the
costs of injuries resulting from defective products" are passed on to the manufacturers
of such products. 59 Cal. 2d at 63, 377 P.2d at 901.
See also Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Williams Machine & Tool Co., 62 Ill. 2d 77,
338 N.E.2d 857, 860 (1975):
The major purpose of strict liability is to place the loss caused by defective
products on those who create risk and reap the profit by placing a defective
product in the stream of commerce, regardless of whether the defect resulted
from the "negligence" of the manufacturer. We believe that this purpose is
best accomplished by eliminating negligence as an element of any strict
liability action ....
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965):
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his product is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to
his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
This note has been written in the midst of an important controversy about the
meaning of the term "unreasonably dangerous" as embodied in the Restatement. In
Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972),
the Supreme Court of California held that it was most consistent with the policy of
strict liability as stated in Greenman v. Yuba, supra note 7, to eliminate all concepts
which "ring in negligence" from strict liability. It was felt that the term
"unreasonably dangerous" injected "reasonable man" considerations into strict
liability cases, and thus the court returned to the defect focus of Greenman.
In light of Ault v. InternationalHarvesterCo., 13 Cal. 3d 113,528 P.2d 1148, 117
Cal. Rptr. 812 (1975), vacating 10 Cal.2d 337, 515 P.2d 313, 110 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1973),
discussed at notes 186-88 infra and accompanying text, the present note uses
"Greenman strict liability" rather than "Restatement strict liability" for the purpose of
analysis. This attitude runs throughout this note and is especially important in the
concluding section on "OSHA and the Expanding Duties of Product Manufacturers."
It was necessary to adopt this approach because, although the Restatement sets a"rule,"
the opinions of Chief Justice Traynor in Greenman and Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring), best articulate
the reasons for the rule. However it succeeds or fails, the Ault decision attempts to face
and develop the underlying policy considerations of strict liability in a way that most
cases do not. Such policy considerations are central to any attempt to analyze the
possible introduction of OSHA regulations as evidence in third-party suits. An
excellent review of California strict liability may be found in Note, ReasonableProduct
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this theory, the plaintiff-employee need no longer prove a negligent
act or omission of the manufacturer. Strict liability attaches
without regard to fault and despite the fact that the manufacturer
may have exercised all possible care.9 Thus, it is now much more
feasible for the worker to be compensated to the full extent of his
injuries. The portion of damages he cannot recover from his
factory-employer may yet be recovered from the manufacturer in a
products liability suit.
Whether the plaintiffs theory of products liability recovery is
strict liability, negligence' ° or implied warranty," his burden of
Safety. Giving Content to the Defectiveness Standard in California Strict Liability
Cases, 10 U.S.F.L. REV. 492 (1976).
In Berkebile v. Brantley Helicopter Corp., 337 A.2d 893, 900 (Pa. 1975),
Pennsylvania Chief Justice Jones adopted the Cronin approach, stating.
The "reasonable man" standard in any form has no place in a strict liability
case. The salutary purpose of the "unreasonably dangerous" qualification is to
preclude the seller's liability where it cannot be said that the product is
defective; this purpose can be met by requiring proof of a defect.
To charge the jury or permit argument concerning the reasonableness of
a consumer's or seller's actions and knowledge, even if merely to define
"defective condition" undermines the policy considerations that have led us to
hold in Salvador [v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 457 Pa. 24, 319 A.2d 903] that
the manufacturer is effectively the guarantor of his product's safety. The
plaintiff must still prove that there was a defect in the product and that the
defect caused his injury, but if he sustains this burden, he will have proved
that as to him the product was unreasonably dangerous. It is therefore
unnecessary and improper to charge the jury on "reasonableness."
A similar result was reached in Pyatt v. Engel Equip., Inc., 17 111. App. 3d 1070,
309 N.E.2d 225 (1974), which held that jury instructions defining the term "unreasonably dangerous" were not necessary.
Because a majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concurred in only the
result of the Berkebile case, rather than the Chief Justice's reasoning, the case has not
been followed as binding Pennsylvania precedent. Beron v. Kramer-Trenton Co., 402
F. Supp. 1268 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Bair v. American Motors Corp., 535 F.2d 249
(3d Cir. 1976). The Beron judge made this comment:
Berkebile, purporting to "clarify the concepts of strict liability under
Pennsylvania law," 337 A.2d at 897, threatens instead to disrupt the orderly
administration of justice in this litigation prone area of the law so long as
these important questions remained unanswered.
Beron at 1269. Whatever the practical merits of this characterization of Berkebile, it is
submitted that there may be cases for which the "confusing" description is more apt.
See note 189 infra.
In the context of the present note, it must be stressed that the definition of
"unreasonable danger" does not affect the general admissibility of OSHA regulations
in products cases. In Bunn v. CaterpillarTractor Co., 415 F. Supp. 286 (W.D. Pa.
1976), the court held OSHA regulations admissible in products liability cases while
declining to follow the Berkebile rationale.
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 (1965):
Negligent Manufacture of Chattel Dangerous Unless Carefully Made
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proof with regard to the character of the machinery is essentially
the same. 12 In strict liability, for example, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that he was injured by a machine which left the
manufacturer's hands in an "unreasonably dangerous" condition.,
Such dangers may be shown by a manufacturing flaw peculiar to
the machine in question 4 or by a design deficiency in all such
15
machines sold by the manufacturer.
Safety codes and standards may be useful to the plaintiff in
defining the dangerous character of the particular machine. Past
industrial safety codes have included those published by private
standards organizations 6 and those enforced by certain states upon
A manufacturer who fails to exercise reasonable care in the manufacture of a
chattel which, unless carefully made, he should recognize as involving an
unreasonable risk of causing physical harm to those who use it for a purpose
for which the manufacturer should expect it to be used and to those whom he
should expect to be endangered by its probable use, is subject to liability for
physical harm caused to them by its lawful use in a manner and for a purpose
for which it is applied.
See also MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
11. See U.C.C. § 2-314(1):
Implied Warranty. Merchantability: Usage of Trade .... [A] warranty that
the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the
seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind....
Privity of contract may not be necessary for the invocation of this warranty,
according to UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318:
Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Express or Implied. A Seller's
warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who is in
the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is
reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the
goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may
not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
See also Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960).
12. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 671-72.
13. See note 8 supra.
14. A flaw in a product is a dangerous condition which occurs in only one of an
entire line of products marketed and sold. Such product was thus not manufactured as
designed. See Keeton, ProductLiability and the Meaningof Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30,
33-34 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Keeton]. See, e.g., Findlay v. Copeland Lumber Co., 265
Ore. 300, 509 P.2d 28 (1973).
15. The term "design deficiency" refers to a dangerous condition common to an
entire line of marketed products. The problem thus originated in the product's design.
See Keeton, supra note 14. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F.Supp. 753 (E.D.Pa. 1971),
affd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973).
16. A private industrial safety code is one which is sponsored by a private
organization for the purpose of encouraging safety within particular manufacturing
industries. Many such codes are sponsored by the American National Standards
Institute, which is discussed in FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at § 5.04.
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factories. 17 Recently, however, the federal government has entered
the field of industrial safety and promulgated a safety code more
comprehensive than anything previously existing.
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 197018 (OSHA)
represents a major federal effort to ensure industrial safety. The
Act's purpose is to prevent accidents before they happen 19 by
enforcing safety standards on the factory-employer. 20 OSHA re21
quires the employer to provide a safe workplace for all employees
and to comply with all regulations promulgated pursuant to the
Act.22 Employees must also obey OSHA regulations, whenever
applicable to their conduct. 23 OSHA does not discuss the duties of
manufacturers who may have sold the factory industrial machinery.
Neither does OSHA expand the civil liability of employers 24 or
others 25 to the employee in case of injury.
Although OSHA cannot expand the manufacturer's duty or
liability, regulations enacted pursuant to OSHA may yet be used for
evidentiary purposes in third-party suits. 26
These regulations
17. An example of a state industrial code which has given rise to important case
law in the area of admission of standards for evidentiary purposes is PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43, §§ 25-1 et. seq. (1964).
18. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970).
19. Id. § 651 (b).
20. Id. § 658(a).
21. 'Id. § 654(aXl).
22. Id. § 654(aX2).
23. Id. § 654(b).
24. Id. § 653(b)(4). A series of cases has denied the employer's civil liability,
based on OSHA violations, pursuant to this section's directive. The first of these cases
was Skidmore v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 356 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. La.), affd, 483
F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973). Obviously, if the civil liability policy were otherwise, the
disruption of existing employer liability programs such as workmen's compensation
acts would have been great.
25. Jeter v. St. Regis Paper Co., 507 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1975) (denying civil
liability based on OSHA of those not "employers"); Russell v. Bartley, 494 F.2d 334 (6th
Cir. 1974) (denying civil liability based on OSHA of an engineer who designed a work
project in which plaintiff-employee was injured); Fawvor v. Texaco, Inc., 387 F. Supp.
626 (E.D. Tex. 1975) (denying civil liability based on OSHA of the employer's
independent contractors); Hare v. Federal Compress and Warehouse Co., 359 F. Supp.
214 (N.D. Miss. 1973) (denying OSHA cause of action against independent contractor).
26. Ina case following Skidmore v. Traveler'sIns. Co., 356 F. Supp. 670(E.D. La.),
affd, 483 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973), on the absence of OSHA civil liabilities it was
noted:
The plaintiff may, of course, use OSHA standards and evidence that they
have been violated as evidence of negligence at trial, to the extent they would
be admissible for that purpose under the rules of evidence.
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Buhler v. Marriott Hotels, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 999 (E.D. La. 1974). Thus, the same court
which handed down the Skidmore decision has recognized that evidentiary uses of
OSHA do not conflict with OSHA's legislative intent and purpose.
The position that OSHA regulations may be relevant evidentially in third-party
suits has also been noted by Hollis and Howell, The OccupationalSafety and Health
Act
Potential Civil Remedies, 10 FORUM 999, 1012 (1975), and Miller, The
OccupationalSafety and Health Act of 1970 and the Law of Torts, 38 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 612, 637-38 (1974).
This note proceeds on the thesis that the threshold problem of OSHA competency
in third-party suits is surmountable. The language in Buhler and the above-cited
commentators support this argument directly, though there are at this time few cases
directly on point. A synthesis of all applicable materials on the subject, however,
should demonstrate that courts which have pondered analogous questions most
seriously have reached the admissibility rule. Admissibility is the result of a more
completely reasoned analysis, as it looks behind the mere fact that a safety code may
"apply" to employers rather than manufacturers. Compare Pyatt v. Engel Equip.,
Inc., 17 Ill. App. 3d 1070, 309 N.E.2d 225 (1974) (state industrial safety rules held
admissible as evidence in products suit), with Heichel v. Lima-Hamilton Corp., 98 F.
Supp. 232 (N.D. Ohio 1951) (state safety statute held inapplicable to third parties
where it was apparently argued as conclusive).
The view is buttressed by two very recent state supreme court decisions, Knight
, 331 So.2d 651 (1976), and
Ala. v. Burns, Kirkley & Williams Const. Co., Dunn v. Brimer, -. Ark. - 537 S.W.2d 164 (1976). Both cases involved negligence
suits against third-parties who were not "employers" of the plaintiffs within OSHA's
definitions. Thus, OSHA could not "apply" or be binding upon these third parties as a
matter of law. These were not negligence per se situations. Still, the regulations were
admissible for the limited evidentiary purpose of helping to determine the standard of
due care that defendant had a duty to follow. The defendant in Knight argued that
OSHA created "no duty" on third parties, citing Skidmore, supra note 24, and Russell,
supra note 25. The court did not deny this, but was careful enough to recognize that
this was not plaintiff's argument:
The plaintiffs have not directed this court's attention to any case which holds
that OSHA establishes a new private civil remedy against anyone for
damages suffered by an employee because of a violation of the Act. In its own
independent research, this court has found no such cases. This court holds
that the plaintiff does not have a private civil remedy in this case because of a
violation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 or the
regulations promulgated thereunder. However, this does not mean that
appropriate and relevant standards and safety requirements established by
OSHA or accompanying regulations are completely and totally irrelevant ..... These safety rules were promulgated by an agency of the United
States Government. Under proper circumstances Occupational Safety and
Health Act provisions and regulations may be admissible for a jury to
consider in determining the standard of care that a defendant should have
followed, if properly introduced....
331 So.2d at 645, following City of Dothan v. Hardy, 237 Ala. 603, 188 So. 264 (1939).
In the Dunn case, the plaintiff was an employee of a general contractor. While
working on a roofing project he was injured by the actions of a subcontractor's
employees. OSHA regulations applicable to the safety of portable ladders were
admitted as evidence of negligence against this subcontractor-defendant, to b.
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include many provisions defining minimum standards of safety for

industrial machinery. 27 Other sections define minimum safety
procedures to be followed by factory workers. 28 The entire regulatory scheme has been called the broadest grant of executive
lawmaking authority in federal history. 29
The possible evidentiary use of OSHA in an injured worker's
suit against a machine manufacturer is the subject of this note. It is
considered along with other facts and circumstances. The Supreme Court of Arkansas
advanced a rationale to support admission somewhat more conventional than that used
in the Knight case:
In that situation the jury might consider, without regard to any employeremployee relationship, whether Dunn's violation of the regulations was
negligence.
Prosser points out that "where the statute does set up
precautions, although only for the protection of a different class of persons, or
the prevention of a distinct risk, this may be a relevant fact, having proper
bearing upon the conduct of a reasonable man under the circumstances,
which the jury should be permitted to consider." Prosser, Torts, p. 202 (4th
ed. 1971). A case on point is Marshallv. Isthmian Lines, 5th Cir., 334 F.2d
131 (1964), where the court held that a violation of a regulation that was
designed to prevent fires could also be considered as evidence of negligence
in a personal injury case.
537 S.W.2d at 166.
See also Bunn v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 415 F. Supp. 286 (W.D. Pa. 1976). This
case has held OSHA regulations admissible as evidence of "unreasonable danger" in a
strict liability context. Language from the case may be found in notes 71 and 72 infra.
A seemingly contra view is taken by Otto v. Specialties,Inc., 386 F. Supp. 1240
(N.D. Miss. 1974). A close reading of that case, however, should demonstrate some
confusion between negligence per se and admission as evidence of negligence. Because of
this problem, the court's discussion of the civil liability policy of OSHA is neither
necessary nor on point. It is not clear whether this confusion emanated from the court
or from the way the case was argued by plaintiffs attorney. It is possible, though, that
the real problem behind the status of OSHA regulations in third-party suits is the way
that many of the early cases, such as Skidmore, supra note 24, and the others cited in
note 25 supra, were argued by plaintiffs attorneys. So many have tried to find either a
new federal tort or a negligence per se situation in OSHA that questions of duty and
evidence have been blurred. The problem should be seen, as addressed directly by
Buhler, Knight, Dunn and Bunn, as one of evidence.
For additional cases implying permissible OSHA use in a third party context, see
Spangler v. Krano, Inc., 481 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1973) (implying that existence of OSHA
regulations would have reflected on manufacturer's reasonable conduct); Scott v. Dreis
& Krump Mfg. Co., 26 Il1. App. 3d 971, 326 N.E.2d 74 (1975) (suggesting that OSHA
would be admissible to evidence machine design and quality); Bell v. Buddies SuperMarket, 516 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (implication that OSHA regulations
would have been admissible at time of ramp construction). But see Jasper v. Skyhook
N.M. App. , 547 P.2d 1140 (1976) (holding that OSHA regulations
Corp., irrelevant and inadmissible for any purpose in products liability).
27. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910 (1975).
28. See, e.g., id. at § 1910.133.
29. Moran, Occupational Safety and Health Standards as Federal Law: The
Hazards of Haste, 15 WM. & MARY L. REv. 777 (1974).
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suggested that a plaintiff may be able to use the regulations as a
basis of expert testimony, as evidence of the defendant's negligence
on the negligence theory, and as evidence of machine defectiveness
or "unreasonable danger." Possible uses of OSHA by the defendant
to show compliance with OSHA standards or to evidence plaintiffs
contributing conduct to injury will also be investigated. In reference to all possible evidentiary uses of OSHA, questions of the
efficacy and weight to be accorded the regulations will be raised.
A corollary purpose of this note is to examine the policy
implications of these evidentiary uses of OSHA in the third-party
context. Products liability suits following an industrial accident are
allowed in order to compensate injured workers fully.3 0 OSHA, on
the other hand, was not promulgated with compensation in mind but
rather for prevention of the industrial accident.31 The question which
will be raised is whether a technically evidentiary use of OSHA by
plaintiff, in light of certain recent strict liability decisions, may in
effect impose an expanded liability for accidents upon the manufacturer. The thesis is that despite OSHA's non-binding effect on
manufacturers, a plaintiffs successful use of the OSHA regulations,
as evidence in conjunction with strict liability, could push a
manufacturer's tort liability to its theoretical limits. This effect is
seen, however, as a result of the policy of strict liability and a result
consistent with that policy. It is not because of any inherent
prejudicial problems in OSHA. Any other new evidentiary tool
injected into a strict liability context, such as post-accident design
changes, may have the same effect on liability.
To more fully appreciate both the practical and theoretical
problems which are raised by OSHA admission in third-party suits,
a hypothetical industrial accident should be considered.
A HYPOTHETICAL INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT CASE
The following hypothetical comprises a common factual setting
which will be used for purposes of illustration throughout this note.
The plaintiff, an industrial worker, was injured during the normal
course of his employment. His injury is causally related to a defect
or a design deficiency in a punch press, the industrial machine
which he operated. The punch press's specific defect or design
deficiency is the absence of safety guards at the point of machine
30. Cf. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358,379, 161 A.2d 69,81
(1960).
31. Brennan v. Occupational Safety and Health Rev. Com'n., 513 F.2d 1032,
1039 (2d Cir. 1975); Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 511 F.2d 864,
870 (10th Cir. 1975).
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operation. This inadequacy is recognized as a danger in the OSHA
regulations. 32 The plaintiff's injury is partial loss of a hand. Since
he has received partial recovery from his employer through workmen's compensation, further actions against the employer are
barred notwithstanding the employer's violation of OSHA regulations.
The inadequacies in punch press guarding did not originate in
the factory where plaintiff was employed. The factory-employer
had neither improved the machine nor allowed it to become more
dangerous during its tenure there. A products liability suit is
subsequently brought by the worker against the third-party manufacturer of the punch press. The purpose of this lawsuit is the
recovery of damages more comprehensive in nature than those
workmen's compensation has provided. The plaintiff pleads the
grounds of negligence, implied warranty, and strict liability.
Assuming that this case is set for trial, each party to the suit, the
plaintiff-employee and the defendant-manufacturer, may have possible evidentiary uses of OSHA regulations. Since the plaintiff's
interest in the punch press standards is most apparent in this
hypothetical, his interests will be outlined first.
The plaintiff may desire to introduce the OSHA punch press
regulation for at least three purposes. First, the plaintiff might use
the regulation as a basis of his expert witness's opinion that the
press was improperly manufactured. The regulation would add a
degree of credibility and objectivity to the expert's opinion by
showing that his definition of the problem is shared by another
neutral authority. Beyond this consideration, the second and third
possible uses of the OSHA regulations by the plaintiff would involve
32. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.217 (1975). This regulation contains specifications for the
safety of several types of "mechanical power presses." It is assumed that the dangers
associated with the punch press in the present hypothetical could be correlated with an
applicable part of this regulation.
The punch press is used for the hypothetical here not only because applicable
regulations may be found, but also because it is a machine which may be crossreferenced easily into many of the central concerns of this note. AFL-CIO v.
Brennan, 530 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1975), discusses the current debate about the
technological feasibility of portions of the above press regulation. Practical problems
in the litigation of punch press products liability cases are analyzed in Trial of a Punch
Press Case, 19 TRIAL LAWYER's GUIDE 249 (1975). Finally, some of the most important
cases discussed in this note deal with presses. See Capasso v. Minister Mach. Co.,
Inc., 532 F.2d 952 (3d Cir. 1976); Scott v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 26 Il. App. 3d
971, 326 N.E.2d 74 (1975); Pyatt v. Engel Equip., Inc., 17 Ill. App. 3d 1070, 309
N.E.2d 225 (1974); Gelsumino v. E.W. Bliss Co., 10 Ill. App. 3d 604, 295 N.E.2d 110
(1973); Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972).
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their admission as independent evidence. It could be argued that
the existence of the standard is evidence of the defendant's negligence. The plaintiff would claim that the reasonable manufacturer
should have had knowledge of safety codes such as OSHA and
implemented their guidelines into his product. Similarly, OSHA
may be used as evidence of an unreasonably dangerous machine
under the strict liability theory. Here, the claim would be that the
OSHA regulation provides an objective definition of such dangers
which the jury should consider. Assuming that any or all these
affirmative uses of OSHA by plaintiff are likely to succeed, the
defendant must be prepared before trial to attack the efficacy and
weight of the applicable regulations.
There may also, however, be three possible affirmative uses of
OSHA by the defendant-manufacturer in the products liability suit.
First, the defendant might attempt to shift the ultimate fault for the
accident upon the factory-employer. For this purpose, defendant
would admit his responsibility but claim that the factory-employer's
violation of OSHA should be considered an intervening and superseding cause of plaintiff's injury. The argument would be that
OSHA evidences a public policy that employers have the primary
responsibility for industrial safety. The second and third affirmative uses of OSHA by the defendant would occur in cases varying
from the original hypothetical. If there were no machine defect
at all under the OSHA definitions in force at the time of manufacture, the defendant might claim that this shows compliance with
OSHA. The defendant would argue that such compliance should
relieve him of liability or at least be evidence of the punch press's
safety. In a final possible affirmative use of OSHA by defendant,
the case would have to involve some injury-causing conduct on the
plaintiff's part. If such conduct can be pinpointed in an OSHA
regulation applicable to employees, the defendant could use OSHA
to evidence plaintiff's contributory negligence or assumption of risk.
It could be contended that the danger actively encountered by the
plaintiff can be objectively defined and that such regulation should
thus be admitted as evidence.
This note is devoted to examining each of the possible uses of
OSHA regulations, as outlined above, in a third-party suit. All of the
plaintiff-initiated and the defendant-initiated uses of the Act, with
the exception of the use of OSHA by defendant to shift the safety duty
upon the factory, are essentially evidentiary uses of the regulations.
Accordingly, all evidentiary uses of OSHA will be discussed before
the broader, concluding discussion of duty and policy questions. The
first set of evidentiary problems to be examined concerns plaintiffinitiated uses of the regulations.
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PLAINTIFF'S USE OF

OSHA

Plaintiffs injured by industrial machinery may attempt to
introduce evidence of OSHA guidelines against manufacturers for
three purposes: first, as a basis of expert testimony; second, as
evidence of the defendant's negligence; and third, as evidence in
defining the machine's unreasonable danger. An analogy to safety
codes similar to OSHA which have been received into evidence in
proper cases will suggest that these uses are permissible. All
affirmative evidentiary uses of OSHA by the plaintiff, however,
must be closely scrutinized with reference to the weight and
relevancy to be accorded specific regulations. Problems with the
vagueness and generality of certain regulations have arisen in OSHA's
primary context, the employer-employee relationship. These same
problems could occur when the regulations are used in products
liability suits and would thus reduce the relevancy of specific
standards there.
As a Basis of Expert Testimony
The use of OSHA regulations as a basis for the plaintiffs expert
testimony should be the most universally acceptable of all OSHA
uses in third-party suits. As a basis of expert opinion, a regulation
is not being offered for the truth of matters asserted. This use of
OSHA regulations is beneficial not only to plaintiffs but also to the
trier of fact. Judges and juries must be able to probe the expert's
knowledge and experience in complex products liability litigation.
Any discussion of industrial safety today is likely to be heavily
influenced by OSHA. OSHA attempts to regulate nearly every
conceivable aspect of the industrial environment. 33 Thus, any
knowlegeable expert employed by plaintiff will know about the
regulations and will probably use them often as a convenient
yardstick in making professional judgments. With so much of the
current dialogue about industrial safety phrased in terms of OSHA
standards and duties,34 it is unreasonable to suppose that such
dialogue can be checked at the point of third-party suits.
33. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1910 (1975).
34. Among the best and most comprehensive of the general law review articles
on OSHA are: Hollis & Howell, OccupationalSafety and Health Act. Potential Civil
Remedies, 10 FORUM 999 (1975); Morey, The General Duty Clause of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970, 86 HARv. L. REV. 988 (1973); Symposium, The
Developing Law of Occupational Safety and Health, 9 GONZAGA L. REV. 333 (1974);
Symposium, The OccupationalSafety and Health Act of 1970, 20 WAYNE L. REV. 987

(1974).
A good overall knowledge of OSHA can be gleaned from the several articles of
Robert Moran, former Chairman and present Commissioner of the OSHA Review
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Just as this use of OSHA dialogue by experts seems inevitable,
so also is the advantage of this development to plaintiffs apparent,
since the credibility of their experts can thereby be strengthened.
The issue might first arise, in the hypothetical punch press case, as
to whether the plaintiffs expert report made reference to a
condition in the machine that was dangerous by OSHA standards.
Such a report would be favorable to plaintiff's case not only because
of the expert's professional opinion, but also because of the invocation of OSHA as an additional outside authority. Plaintiff's
attorney will obviously desire to retain this emphasis at trial. An
expert is always personally impeachable on the obvious basis that he
is paid and employed by the plaintiff. 35 An expert opinion based
upon a knowledge of federal regulations, however, may add a degree
of credence and objectivity to the testimony. OSHA standards,
established in view of a pre-existing public interest neutral to
either party in the lawsuit, are not impeachable on the basis of
financial alliance to the plaintiff.
The danger to defendant in such a situation is that the regulation is being brought before the jury without being admitted as
independent probative evidence. Association of safety codes with
expert testimony has been termed a "covert admissibility," 6 since it
may be that for various reasons the OSHA regulation is inadmissible independently. 37 A traditional objection to overall safety code
admission is hearsay. 3s It has been said, for instance, that such
Commission: A Court in the Executive Branch of Government The Strange Case of the
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 20 WAYNE L. REV. 979 (1974);
Critique of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 67 Nw. U.L. REV.
260 (1972); Discretionary Review by the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission: Is It Necessary?, 46 U. COLO. L. REV. 139 (1974); How to ObtainJob Safety
Justice, 24 LABOR LJ. REV. 387 (1973); OccupationalSafety and Health Standardsas
FederalLaw: The Hazards of Haste, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 777 (1974); Oversight of
Penalty Increases and Adjudicatory Functions Under the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970, 33 FEDERAL BAR J. 138 (1974); Parties to Proceedingsin the Court
of Appeals Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 15 B.C. INDUS.
& COM. L. REV. 1089 (1974); The Legal Process for Enforcement of the
OccupationalSafety and HeathActofl970,9 GONZAGA L. REV. 349(1974); The Impactof
the Job Safety Act, 6 GEORGIA L. REV. 489 (1972).
35.

C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 78-81 (2d ed. 1974).

36. Note, Admissibility of Safety Codes, Rules and Standards in Negligence
Cases, 37 TENN. L. REV. 581, 590-92 (1970). The general idea presented is that safety
codes often come before the jury, without regard to the controlling law, through the
testing of experts and in other instances where the defendant fails to object.
37. Id. at 581-87. See also Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 778 (1961), which states that at
one time the rule of independent inadmissibility was the "majority" rule. A
superseding annotation, 58 A.L.R.3d 148 (1974), says there is no longer a "majority" or
"minority" view here.
38. See notes 36 and 37 supra.
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standards are only the opinion of the authors.3 9 There is also the
danger that the data relied upon was written primarily for the use
of experts and will be difficult for the trier of fact to understand. 40
The expert could thus use the code out of its specific context too freely
or could misapply it, without the laymen in court being able to
recognize such misapplication. 41 Finally, the authors of a safety code
such as OSHA are not present for cross-examination. 42 If such dangers
appear present in independent admission of the code, the defendant
might argue that these dangers are only compounded by allowing
the code to be repeated by a private expert. Since OSHA has the
force of law in another context, the defendant could argue that its
repetition by a private party intensifies the hearsay dangers because
such a party is not qualified to interpret law.
Allowing the expert to refer to OSHA as the basis of opinion,
however, is advantageous to the trier of fact as well as the plaintiff.43
It has been suggested that laymen in court are experiencing much
difficulty in evaluating the various technical problems associated
with products liability litigation, a stumbling block most crucial in
"design" cases. 44 Much of the basic terminology needed to discuss
the character of industrial machinery, though, can be found in
OSHA. 45 It is best for all concerned to know where this terminology
39. Mississippi Power & Light Co., v. Whitescarver, 68 F.2d 928 (5th Cir.
1934); Milner Enterprises, Inc. v. Jacobs, 207 So. 2d 85 (Miss. 1968).
40. Milner Enterprises, Inc. v. Jacobs, 207 So. 2d 85 (Miss. 1968).
41. 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1690 (3d ed. 1940).
42. See note 39 supra.
43. Pyatt v. Engel Equip., Inc., 17 Ill. App. 3d 1070, 309 N.E.2d 225 (1974).
In this case concerning the design of a press brake, the plaintiff's expert was allowed to
describe design standards of such machinery but was prohibited from identifying the
source of the standards. This source was a code promulgated by the state Industrial
Commission, which was without force of law in the case at hand. The manufacturer
argued that allowing the plaintiff's expert to discuss the standards was enough to cure
the error, but the court disagreed:
We do not share this view, since it would be of substantial relevance in
evaluating a standard to know the source of the standard as distinguished
from the opinion of a single expert. That the expert did describe the
standard without identification of its source without claim of error would
seem to establish the relevancy of the standards as described in the rules as
applied to the design of the machine.
Id. at 1072-73, 309 N.E.2d at 227.
44. See Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturer's Conscious Design
Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1973); Weinstein,
Twerski, Piehler and Donaher, Products Liability: An Interaction of Law and
Technology, 12 DuQ. L. REV. 425 (1974).
45. See, e.g, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.211(dX46) (1975), which contains definitions basic
to the description of the power press which is the subject of this hypothetical:
"Press" means a mechanically powered machine that shears, punchs, forms
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comes from and if that source is in fact the basis of the expert's
opinion.
OSHA definitions could thus serve the purposes of
rendering objective the dialogue and solving basic semantic problems in technically complex litigation.
Probative dangers to defendant, such as hearsay problems, can
be overcome if the plaintiff is careful to point out that the regulation
is not being offered by the expert to prove the truth of the matters
asserted. The OSHA regulations, if cited by the expert in defining
what he considers defective, are at this point merely the basis of his
opinion. 46 It is this expert testimony itself that is being offered for the
truth of the matters asserted. Thus this basis is not the critical
testimony but is rather a tool with which the jury can weigh and
measure the expert. 47 This being the case, it is unnecessary to consider
whether the safety regulation itself creates the standard by which to
judge the defendant's conduct or the design of his machine.48
Finally, there are many methods short of prohibiting the expert's
use of OSHA by which the defendant can protect himself from any
prejudicial impact. Cautionary instructions could be elicited from
the judge to keep the distinction between the privately affiliated
expert and the basis of his testimony clear in the jury's mind.
Moreover, the defendant can cross-examine the expert extensively
about the basis of his testimony and whether the expert has, in fact,
as extensive a knowledge of OSHA as he claims. The efficacy of the
particular regulations cited by the expert could be attacked. 49 Even
if the expert has testified without reference to OSHA, the defendant
or assembles metal or other material by means of cutting, shaping, or
combination dies attached to slides. A press consists of a stationary bed or
anvil, and a slide (or slides) having a controlled reciprocating motion toward
and away from the bed surface, the slide being guided in a definite path by
the frame of the press.
46. Sweargin v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 376 F.2d 637 (10th Cir. 1967). Part of the
expert's testimony, reprinted in the record, provides a good blueprint for establishing
a safety code as the basis of expert opinion:
As an engineer I am familiar with the American Standards Safety
Specifications generally.... They haven't the force of law. But they are
standards which I as an engineer and others in my field have the need to be
acquainted with ....
In order to acquaint myself with a subject or with
standards, I have to go to material like this.
Id. at 641.
A good case analyzing the guidelines for expert use in industrial products
liability is Moren v. Samuel Langston Co., 96 Ill. App. 2d 133, 237 N.E.2d 759 (1968).
47. Pyatt v. Engel Equip., Inc., 17 Ill. App. 3d 1070, 309 N.E.2d 225 (1974).
48. Sweargin v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 376 F.2d 637, 641 (10th Cir. 1967).
49. See notes 96-115 infra and accompanying text.
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should still be able to discover on cross-examination the true basis of
his opinion if this would be desirable. 50
Many recent products liability cases allow the expert to discuss
a safety code as a basis of his testimony, even if the code does not
have the force of law in the case at hand or may be independently
inadmissible. 51 OSHA regulations should be similarly regarded,
especially in light of the technical complexity of many industrial
machinery cases. The best position is that the jury is entitled to
have such a basis of opinion before them, as it is of substantial
relevance to their evaluations. 52 It is probable that this view is
already widely accepted, and that where it is not, such evidence
inevitably and covertly still comes before the jury.s
A more crucial battleground of safety code admission by
plaintiffs has already been suggested and will now be discussed: use
of a code as independent evidence of negligence or of the dangerous
character of the machinery.
Safety Code as Evidence of Negligence or Dangerous
Machine Character
Beyond the use of OSHA regulations as a basis of plaintiff's
expert testimony, two other possible uses of the regulations are to
evidence defendant's negligence and the dangerous character of the
machinery in question. These additional uses involve the admission
of the regulations as independent evidence and will be discussed
together here. Two arguments against OSHA admission are that the
regulations are hearsay and that they lack the force of law when
taken out of context. Similar arguments have been overcome in
recent cases in which safety codes similar to OSHA have been
admitted into evidence. A plaintiff's invocation of federal safety law,
however, may increase the difficulties faced by third-party defen50.

See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 705. Defendant might want the OSHA basis dis-

closed as a foundation to a later attack on the efficacy of safety standards. See notes 95114 infra and accompanying text.
51. Muncie Aviation Corp. v. Party Doll Fleet, Inc., 519 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir.
1975); Sweargin v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 376 F.2d 637 (10th Cir. 1967); Dorsey v.
Yoder, 331 F.Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Wenzell v. MTD Prod., Inc., 32 Ill. App. 3d
279, 336 N.E.2d 125 (1975); Pyatt v. Engel Equip., Inc., 17 Il1. App. 3d 1070, 309
N.E.2d 225 (1974).
See also the line of cases that seems to limit the plaintiff's use of safety codes to
their basis as expert testimony and would thus disallow the uses discussed in the next
subsection of this note: Hercules Power Co. v. DiSibatino, 55 Del. 516, 188 A.2d 529
(1963); Coger v. Mackinaw Prod. Co., 48 Mich. App. 113, 210 N.W.2d 124 (1973);
Lemery v. O'Shea Dennis Inc., 291 A.2d 616 (N.H. 1972).
52. See note 43 supra.
53. See note 36 supra.
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dants. Defendants will be forced to attack the efficacy of federal
standards, which may subtly impeach the credibility of their case.
The degree of such impeachment will depend on the efficacy of the
OSHA regulations in question, discussed later in this note.
As suggested by the hypothetical punch press case, there are
particular burdens of proof which the products liability plaintiff
carries and which OSHA can facilitate. Under the negligence
theory, the plaintiff must prove some conduct of the defendantmanufacturer, such as an act or omission in disregard of a dangerous
condition.54 Under the theory of negligence or strict liability,
something objectively dangerous in the character of the punch press
itself must be shown.5 This machine character is usually referred to
as "defectiveness" in negligence cases,M and "unreasonable danger"
in strict liability cases, 57 but what must be shown in either theory is
basically the same.e
If the punch press as manufactured was lacking in certain
safety characteristics as defined by OSHA, the regulations' value to
the plaintiff in overcoming his burden of proof is readily apparent.
Safety codes and standards can show that certain safeguards are
practical, feasible, and generally used in the custom and practice of
the particular manufacturing industry in question. 59 If such
standards were in existence at the time of manufacture, 60 it could be
advanced that the defendant's failure to know and implement them
6
indicates that he did not act reasonably and was thus negligent. '
54. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 644.
55. Id. at 671-72.
56. See, e.g., id. at 643: "The rule that has finally emerged is that the seller is
liable for negligence in the manufacture or sale of any product which may reasonably
be expected to be capable of inflicting substantial harm if it is defective."
57. See, e.g., id. at 659: "There must... be something wrong with the product
which makes it unreasonably dangerous to those who come in contact with it." The
term is adopted from the second Restatement of Torts. See note 8 supra.
58. Id. at 671-72.
59. See, e.g., McComish v. DeSoi, 42 N.J. 274, 281, 200 A.2d 116, 121 (1964),
characterizing a safety code introduced into a products liability case as "illustrative
evidence of safety practices or rules generally prevailing in the industry."
60. The traditional rule is that the relevancy of safety codes is determined by
their existence at the time of manufacture.
See notes 169-76 infra and
accompanying text. Even if an OSHA regulation is inadmissible for this reason, such
regulation may have been adopted from a pre-existing private code which did exist at
manufacture. See note 66 infra. The value of OSHA regulations in many negligence
cases, then, may be as an index for the attorney preparing litigation.
61. The idea here is that once a duty of reasonable care exists, general customs
and practices are relevant as an evidentiary guide toward the definition of that duty in
a particular situation. Safety codes are thus admitted as part of that custom and
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Likewise, the burden of showing a particular machine characteristic "defective" or "unreasonably dangerous" can be directly evidenced by reference to OSHA regulations. OSHA contains an
elaborate section on power press specifications which points out
62
several machine characteristics and dangers to be guarded against.
An absence of any one of these safeguards could thus be proof that
the machine in question fails to measure up to an objective standard
of minimal safety.63
A defense argument that OSHA is legally binding within the
employer-employee relationship, and not upon third-party manufacturers, may be of no avail to the defendant in trying to exclude
the regulations. Past safety codes similar to OSHA, both public 64
practice, not as a fixed rule the violation of which automatically makes defendant
negligent. This was articulated in McComish v. DeSoi 42 N.J. 274, 281, 200 A.2d 116,
121 (1964):
The basic test as to the responsibility of Beloit here is whether reasonable
care was exercised in the construction and assembly of the A sling. That is
the standard to be used and departure or deviation therefrom is negligence.
In applying the standard reasonable men recognize that what is usually done
may be evidence of what ought to be done. And so the law permits the
methods, practices or rules experienced men generally accept and follow to
be shown as an aid to the jury in comparing the conduct of the alleged
tortfeasor with the required norm of reasonable prudence. It is not
suggested that the safety practices are of themselves the absolute measure of
due care. They are simply evidence of "how to" assemble the sling as
commonly practiced by those who have experience in doing -it. It is
important that their limited function and probative force be appreciated.
Similar rationale was applied by the court in Muncie Aviation Corp. v. Party
Doll Fleet, Inc., 519 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1975), which held F.A.A. advisory materials
admissible as evidence of negligence even though they were not dispositive of the
applicable standard of care. Another case is Butler v. Sonneborn Sons, Inc., 296 F.2d
623 (2d Cir. 1961), which admitted I.C.C. regulations as evidence of negligence, even
though such regulations had the force of law in contexts other than the case at hand.
Finally, two recent third-party suits have allowed the admission of OSHA
regulations as evidence of negligence. In both of these cases the duty owed by the
defendant was the common law duty of reasonable care, not the duty of obeying OSHA.
The admission of OSHA in these cases is thus directly analogous to the admission of
OSHA in the third-party negligent products design context. See Knight v. Burns,
Kirkley & Williams Constr. Co., Ala. , 331 So. 2d 651 (1976); Dunn
v. Brimer, Ark. , 537 S.W.2d 164 (1976). The rationale of these cases is
discussed in note 26 supra.
62. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.217 (1975).
63. Safety codes are generally only considered minimal standards since it may
be necessary to demand more of manufacturers then mere compliance. See notes 118
-21 infra.
64. Butler v. Sonneborn Sons, Inc., 296 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1961); Green v.
Sanitary Scale, 296 F. Supp. 625 (E.D. Pa. 1969), revd on other grounds, 431 F.2d 371
(3d Cir. 1970); Smith v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 194 F. Supp. 530 (E.D. Pa. 1961), revd on
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and private," have been held admissible in contexts where they
lacked the force of law. Since OSHA is basically only a more
comprehensive version of prior similar industrial codes, and in fact
incorporates many of these prior codes directly,66 recent precedents
favoring admission should control. The plaintiff cannot claim that
OSHA is binding upon the manufacturer 67 or creates civil liabilities.6 8 As long as plaintiff keeps the more limited evidentiary
purpose of admitting the regulations clear, the defendant's claim that
OSHA is not binding does not meet plaintiffs argument.6 9 The
plaintiff is not arguing that the regulations are conclusive on
defendant's legal duty, but only that they are some evidence of
defendant's failure to meet that duty. Few cases have dealt directly
with OSHA regulations or suggested that they would be admissible
other grounds, 301 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1962); Muncie Aviation Corp. v. Party Doll Fleet,
Inc., 519 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1975); Balido v. Improved Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d
App. 3d 1070, 309
633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1973); Pyatt v. Engel Equip., Inc., 17 Ill.
N.E.2d 225 (1974). Of the above cases, Butler, Green, Smith and Muncie were specifically negligence decisions. See also notes 36 and 37 supra.
65. Wallner v. Kitchens of Sara Lee, 419 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1970); Stanley v.
United States, 347 F. Supp. 1088 (D.C. Me. 1972), vacated on other grounds 476 F.2d
606 (1st Cir. 1973); Brandon v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 220 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. Pa.
App. 3d 279, 336 N.E.2d 125 (1975); Reil
1963); Wenzell v. MTD Prod., Inc., 32 I11.
v. Lowell Gas Co., 353 Mass. 120, 228 N.E.2d 707 (1967); Ward v. City Ntl. Bank &
Trust Co., 379 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. 1964); Wilson v. Lowe's Asheboro Hardware, Inc., 259
N.C. 660, 131 S.E.2d 501 (1963); McComish v. DeSoi, 42 N.J. 274, 200 A.2d 116 (1964).
But see Hackley v.Waldorf-Hoener Paper Prod., Co., 149 Mont. 286, 425 P.2d 712
(1967). See also notes 36 and 37 supra.
66. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1970). This section gives the Secretary of Labor
power to promulgate an OSHA standard without formal rulemaking procedures if it is
found to be a "national consensus standard." National concensus standards include
those promulgated by private standards producing organizations. 29 U.S.C. § 652(9).
OSHA's adoption of several such private standards from the American National
Standards Institute is discussed by the Chairman of the Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission in Moran, OccupationalSafety and Health Standards as
Federal Law: The Hazardsof Haste, 15 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 777, 785-92 (1974). An
attorney can determine whether an OSHA standard has been adopted from a preexisting private code by a reference in the Federal Register to the end of the subpart
containing the regulation in question.
67. See notes 18-25 supra and accompanying text.
68. Id.
,69. See, eg., Smith v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 194 F. Supp. 530 (E.D. Pa. 1961), rev'd
on other grounds,302 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1962), where a state general safety law binding
on the employer-factory was offered as evidence against a manufacturer. The jury was
told that they could consider these safety laws and regulations as a factor in their
deliberations on whether machine design was safe and manufacturer was negligent.
They were not told that violation of these regulations would make defendant liable. On
appeal defendant claimed that this evidence should not have been admitted since it did
not "apply" to him. The court disagreed:
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as evidence of negligence or machine dangerousness.7 0 Three recent
cases, however, have held OSHA regulations relevant and admissible
as evidence in a third-party context, over general objections that
OSHA creates no duty and does not apply to such parties.7' These
cases correctly saw the problem as an evidentiary one and not one of
duty and liability based on OSHA. To keep this distinction clear
before the jury, cautionary instructions are possible and may be
72
granted.
We think counsel for defendant misunderstands the function that the statute
served in this case. This was not a proceeding under the statute: nor was the
rule of negligence per se involved. Rather, this was an ordinary negligence
action in which ... the Regulations were before the jury as evidence ...
as to the safety features of design necessary to make... a reasonably safe
machine.
Id. at 522.
70. See note 26 supra.
71. Knight v. Burns, Kirkley & Williams Const. Co., Ala. -, 331 So.
2d 651 (1976); Dunn v. Brimer, Ark. -, 537 S.W.2d 164 (1976). These cases are
quoted and analyzed in note 26 supra.
See also Bunn v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 415 F. Supp. 286 (W.D. Pa. 1976). In
this strict liability case, plaintiff was allowed to read both portions of a manual of the
Army Corps of Engineers and applicable OSHA regulations into the record as
evidence of unreasonable danger. The Court held that whether the cause of action was
negligence or strict liability, the jury,
could consider Regulations which set forth safety standards for people other
than defendants. The juries in both cases had to reach a conclusion as to
whether the machines in their respective cases were "reasonably safe" or
"unreasonable dangerous." In both cases, they were allowed to use the
Regulations as a factor in their ultimate decisions.
Id. at 292 (emphasis in original).
The Court cited the cases of Smith and Green, note 64 supra, as support of the
above proposition, and concluded:
The Regulations in both the Smith and Green cases were used to
determine an "acceptable standard of design" and to use this standard to
decide either "lack of due care" or "unreasonably dangerous" is a distinction
without a difference.
Id. at 293.
Finally, the Bunn court approved certain cautionary jury instructions that could
be used when OSHA regulations were put before a jury. See note 72 infra.
72. See, e.g., Bunn v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 415 F.Supp. 286 (W.D. Pa. 1976),
which held OSHA regulations admissible as evidence of unreasonable danger. The
judge charged the jury:
You are particularly cautioned to recall that the Court instructed you
with respect to various rules and regulations requiring back-up mirrors and
audible signaling devices. These rules and regulations were not to be
considered as imposing a legislative standard of conduct upon any one other
than the user or consumer, which in this case is Ace.
Within the facts of this case, the plaintiff contends that the product, the
988 Caterpillar, was unreasonably dangerous when it left the hands of
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Even if it is unsound to attack the admissibility of OSHA
regulations on the ground they do not have the force of law in the
third-party context, the regulations may yet be vulnerable as
hearsay. Unlike the situation in which the expert refers to the
regulations as a basis of his testimony, the attempt here is to offer
them for the truth of the matters asserted. The regulations are
being advanced as direct proof that defendant was negligent and
that his product was dangerous. Until recently, the majority of
cases supported hearsay objections against safety code admission.7 a
Typically it was asserted that such codes were only the opinion of
Caterpillar, and this is a question of fact for you to determine as to
Caterpillar without regard to these safety rules and regulations except as you
may decide they determine a standard of conduct and which you would then
apply to the manufacturer. They do not apply to the manufacturer under the
persons to whom the rules and regulations were issued. And as I said, I think
you realize when I talk about the consumer or user I am referring to Ace
Drilling Company and its employees, including Mr. Bunn.
Id. at 291-92.
Consistent with this, the Court approved the following point for charge
submitted by the defendant:
You have heard the testimony in this case about OSHA and MESA
regulations. I instruct you that those regulations do not apply to Caterpillar
Tractor Company and Caterpillar Tractor Company was not under any
obligation to obey those regulations.
Id. at 291-92.
The Bunn court cited Green v. Sanitary Scale Co., 296 F. Supp. 625 (E.D. Pa.
1969), rev'd on other grounds, 431 F.2d 371 (3d Cir. 1970), as precedent in favor of the
rule of admissibility. The instructions in Green were these:
Rule 4 dealt specifically with the safety standard for meat grinding. The
failure to measure up to the standards cannot be considered conclusive
evidence that the manufacturer was negligent, for the focus of these
regulations is toward the conduct of persons or employers who run businesses
within the state, and not toward manufacturers of chattels.
However, you may consider these regulations as a factor in determining
whether the defendant negligently designed its meat grinder; that is, you
may consider whether the defendant should have followed these standards or
ones similar to them when they designed their meat grinder, and whether
failure to follow such standards was a lack of due care.
Green, supra,296 F. Supp. at 628. Greenwas a negligence case, involving admission of
state safety regulations binding on the employer as evidence against the machine
manufacturer. The Bunn court, which declined to accept the definition of "unreasonable danger" espoused by Pennsylvania Chief Justice Jones in Berkebile v. Brantly
Helicopter Corp., 337 A.2d 893 (Pa. 1975), felt that the fact that Green was a negligence
case as opposed to the strict liability defect issue in Bunn was "a distinction without a
difference." Bunn at 293.
73. Note, Admissibility of Safety Codes, Rules, and Standards in Negligence
Cases, 37 TENN. L. REV. 581, 590-92 (1970). See also ANNOT., 75 A.L.R.2d 778 (1961),
superceded by Annot., 58 A.L.R.3d 148 (1974).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol11/iss1/3

et al.: The Use of OSHA in Products Liability Suits Against the Manufactu

1976]

THE USE OF OSHA

out-of-court persons 74 who were not present for cross-examination. 75
The substance of the safety guidelines themselves were said to be
descriptive of an inexact and changing science, 76 upon which the
opinions of the writers may have changed. 77 Hence, courts generally were comparing safety codes to "learned treatises,"78 excludable
because of their lack of trustworthiness 79 and the lack of necessity for
them. o
The recent trend, given impetus by the growth of products
liability law, has been to find indications of necessity and trustworthiness in safety codes sufficient to withstand hearsay objections.81
Such codes have been recognized as statements of a general
consensus about particular industries and thus distinct from
"learned treatises," which are normally the opinion of only one
writer.8 2 Trustworthiness has been found both in the consensus
aspect of the codes and in the idea that they were presumably
compiled by knowledgeable persons 83 with no conceivable intent to
74. Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Whitescarver, 68 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1934);
Milner Enterprises v. Jacobs, 207 So. 2d 85 (Miss. 1968).
75. Id. See also Dechert v. Municipal Elec. Light Co., 39 App. Div. 490, 57
N.Y.S. 225 (1899).
76. Milner Enterprises v. Jacobs, 207 So. 2d 85 (Miss. 1968).
77. Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Whitescarver, 68 F.2d 928(5th Cir. 1934).
78. 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1698 (Supp. 1964). See also FED. R. EViD. 803 (18),
making an express exception to the hearsay rule for learned treatises. The new rule is
discussed in the context of strict products liability in Comment, 27 S.C.L. REV.
766 (1966), where it is argued that it should not be too restrictively applied. The author
believes that this rule can make needed and reliable sources of evidence available to
plaintiffs efficiently and inexpensively.
79. Standard Life Ins. Co. of the South v. Strong, 19 Tenn. App. 404, 424, 89
S.W.2d 367, 379 (1935).
80. Id.
81. McComish v. DeSoi, 42 N.J. 274, 200 A.2d 116 (1964); Nordstrom v. White
Metal Rolling & Stamping Corp., 75 Wash. 2d 629, 453 P.2d 619 (1969).
82. See, e.g., McComish v. DeSoi, 42 N.J. 274, 281, 200 A.2d 116, 121 (1964):
In this case, however, the manuals were not received as learned treatises.
They were introduced as safety codes, as objective standards of safe
construction, generally recognized and accepted as such in the type of
construction industry involved. A treatise is usually no more than one
expert's opinion regarding a particular factual complex. On the other hand,
a safety code ordinarily represents a consensus of opinion carrying the
approval of a significant segment of an industry. Such a code is not
introduced as substantive law, as proof of regulations or absolute standards
having the force of law or of scientific truth.
83. See, e.g., Nordstrom v. White Metal Rolling & Stamping Corp., 75
Wash. 2d 629, 633, 453 P.2d 619, 623 (1969):
If a publication is produced by persons or groups having special
knowledge regarding the subject under discussion, and having no motive to
falsify, but having rather every reason to state the facts as they are known to
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falsify.8 4 The necessity for admitting the codes without calling the
authors to testify personally is also present, especially in view of the
extreme impracticality of undertaking to call such witnesses.8 5 Both
private8 6 and public 87 safety codes have thus been admitted against
manufacturers in industrial accident cases on the issue of defendant's
negligence. Admission of safety codes on the issue of the unreasonably dangerous character of the product has likewise been held
permissible.86
Grounds for hearsay objections to OSHA should be even weaker
than those for hearsay objections to former codes. Not only would it
be ludicrous to compel the plaintiff to locate and subpoena the
particular federal officials who adopt and enforce the various OSHA
the author or authors, subjecting them to cross-examination would be a
superfluous activity.
The trustworthiness... was established beyond any reasonable cavil. It
was published after thorough research by a special committee assigned to
study appropriate standards for construction, care and use of ladders, a
subcommittee of which did the research on metal ladders. The personnel of
the committee represented interested manufacturers, consumers.... A total
of 23 organizations was represented. If objectivity was not established by
this representation of interested parties, the lack of such objectivity could
presumably be demonstrated by the plaintiff. He did not seriously challenge
it, however, and the trial court should have had no difficulty in deciding that
the code was trustworthy.
84.
A motive to falsify could hardly survive in such a diversified group; and
the pertinent facts on which to base a code of standards were within the
knowledge of the participants. This code was promulgated before the
facts giving rise to this litigation occurred; and it was not drawn with a
view to favoring the position of a manufacturer in this or any other
litigation.
Id.
85.
The participants are too many in number and too widely scattered. It
would be highly impractical, if not impossible, to gather them together to
testify at the trial, and it is doubtful if their testimony would add anything
to the trustworthiness which is imported by the circumstances under
which it was prepared.
Id
86. See note 65 supra.
87. See note 64 supra.
88. Balido v. Improved Mach., Inc., 29 Cal.App. 3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890
(1973) (non-compliance with standard, from industrial safety order directed to
employers, as evidence of manufacturer's deficient design where strict liability was in
issue); Pyatt v. Engel Equip., Inc., 17 Ill. App. 3d 1070, 309 N.E.2d 225 (1974) (state
health and safety code, directed toward factory, admissible to show standards of design
in strict liability case); Price v. Buckingham Mfg. Co., 110 N.J. Super. 462, 266 A.2d
140 (1970) (admissibility of industry practices on strict liability issue). See also
Brandon v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 220 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
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regulations, but partisan testimony by OSHA officials is expressly
forbidden.8 9 The element of necessity is therefore clearer than with
pre-existing codes. An added element of trustworthiness is also
present in many of the regulations. Where OSHA had adopted preexisting "consensus" standards from private codes, there is the
consensus not only of the particular industrial organizations but also
of the federal government that such measures are necessary and
effective in furthering occupational safety. 90 In effect, it may be said
that the very existence of OSHA demonstrates that industrial safety
is no longer the "inexact and changing" science it once may have
been.
The disadvantage to third-party manufacturers in this development of the law is a subtle one. Manufacturers would apparently be
no more disadvantaged by the plaintiff's use of OSHA regulations
than by plaintiff's use of former codes. Since OSHA regulations are
precisely the same kind of standards which have often been held
admissible, it cannot seriously be contended that these precedents do
not apply. The only difference between OSHA and the former
industrial codes is one of degree. The OSHA regulations are
promulgated by the federal government, a body with wider authority
than any previous body which undertook to prescribe industrial
safety standards. The regulations themselves are more comprehensive in scope than any former codes which attempted to standardize
industrial machinery and practices. Even if this regulatory scheme
often involves the adoption of pre-existing codes, these various
standards are still consolidated in one place, the Federal Register,
and hence become more accessible to all plaintiff's attorneys.
It has been suggested that OSHA may further benefit the injured
worker by making his case less dependent upon expert testimony
than it was in the past. 91 In cases of glaring disparity between the
safety condition of the machine in question and OSHA regulations,
89. See 29 C.F.R. § 1906 (1975). This regulation discusses calling OSHA
administration employees as witnesses in private litigation. Only facts within the
personal knowledge of the OSHA employee may be testified to, and such employee may
not give expert opinions. The policy is both to protect the official intergrity of OSHA
from confusion with an employee's personal opinions about standards, and to avoid
spending federal time and money for private purposes.
90. 29 U.S.C. § 652(9) (1970). National consensus standards, adopted as OSHA
regulations pursuant to this section, carry the additional consensus of both the
Secretary of Labor and "other appropriate Federal agencies" that the standard should
be adopted. See also 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1970), which sets "reasonably necessary or
appropriate to provide safe and healthful employment" as the Secretary's guideline for
adopting standards.
91. Stramondon, Litigation Impac4 9 TRIAL 29 (July/Aug. 1973).
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the trier of fact may hardly need an expert at all from the plaintiff's
point of view. 92 The dangerous character of the punch press, for
example, could be seen as a fact objectively recognized. 93 The
defendant's need for expert opinion could then become correspondingly greater. The purpose of such expert help for the defendant
would obviously be to explain away the disparity either by showing
that OSHA does not apply or by attacking the federal standard's
efficacy. The very implication that a federal regulation and federal
concern is involved may in itself carry weighty implications to a jury,
and a defendant's attack upon such standards may thus subtly
impeach the credibility of his entire case. Because the OSHA
standard should be admissible to show negligence or dangerousness,
however, the defendant will have little choice. These dangers to
defendant must be balanced against possibly worse damage to his
case when the regulations slip before the jury covertly, as in the
testimony of plaintiff's expert. In such situations, plaintiff gets in a
reference to federal standards, but defendant does not have a fair and
adequate chance to attack the efficacy of such standards.
Beyond the evidentiary use of OSHA regulations to define
negligence or dangerousness, plaintiffs may want to expand the
jury's perception of the defendant's duty of safe product manufacture
in light of OSHA disparities. This problem will arise in cases where
the particular machinery is old or was manufactured before OSHA
was created. The fact that standards were promulgated after
manufacture may be a good defense against their use in negligence
cases.9 The duty therein is to be aware of what a reasonable
manufacturer would know at the time of the product's sale and to
incorporate such knowledge into the product. Where strict liability is
involved, however, the limits of defendant's safety duty are not as
clear. The problem of the "time of standards promulgation" will be
left as a variable in the hypothetical accident for now, since it is
basically a question of duty and policy to be discussed later. 95
In summary, the three possible evidentiary uses of OSHA by
plaintiff are: first, as a basis of expert testimony; second, as indepenent evidence of defendant's negligence in failing to incorporate recognized safeguards; and third, as independent evidence of recognized
92. Id.
93. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.217(1975). See also notes 97 and 98 infra. In these sources,
containing administrative litigation on specific OSHA regulations, the attorney can
find additional evidence concerning the recognition of specific punch press dangers.
94. See, e.g., Bell v. Buddies Super-Market, 516 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. Civ. App.
1974).
95. See notes 169-95 infra and accompanying text.
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dangerous qualities in the machinery in question. A further question
grows out of these plaintiff-initiated uses of OSHA: what can the
defendant do to attack the OSHA regulations once they have been
offered against him?
Efficacy of ParticularOSHA Regulations
When a plaintiff has offered an OSHA regulation into evidence,
defendant may reduce the weight to be given the standard by directly
challenging the efficacy of the particular standard. Although
rebuttal evidence against the standard is an alternative tactic, 96 only
direct attacks on efficacy are dealt with here, since such attacks are
more particularly related to the value of the regulations in themselves. A reference to OSHA's primary context, the employeremployee relationship, demonstrates that there have sometimes been
problems with the application of certain regulations there. Such
problems of efficacy could arise not only within OSHA's primary
context, but also where OSHA is introduced in products liability
suits. Where a regulation's introduction carries too many dangers of
vagueness and inapplicability, it should be excluded on the ground of
irrelevance.
In order to study the evidentiary value of the regulations
promulgated under OSHA, the attorney must look to sources outside
the general body of appellate court reporters. There are as yet no
reported cases discussing particular problems of OSHA regulation
efficacy in the third-party context. In its primary context, however,
OSHA has been in effect for five years. There has been a
considerable amount of administrative litigation in this area, mainly
as a result of factories appealing the reasonableness and applicability
of various regulations. Both official 97 and private98 reporting services
make these administrative cases accessible to the defense lawyer. If it
becomes evident from these sources that a regulation has been of
little value in effectuating its primary purpose, it is then doubtful
96. Rebuttal evidence could presumably be in the form of contrary safety codes
or industry customs. Its use should be permissible since OSHA is not conclusive on
defendant's duty and can at best be used for evidentiary purposes. Cf. Smith v.
Aaron, __
Ark. , 508 S.W.2d 320 (1974) (negligence per se situation).
97. The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission Reports
(OSAHRC) are the official reports.
98. The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. publishes the Occupational Safety &
Health Reporter (Occ. SAF. & HEALTH REP.). The publication is a looseleaf service
which is later bound as Occupational Safety & Health Cases (Occ. Saf. & Health Cas.).
Commerce Clearing House, Inc. publishes Occupational Saf. and Health Decisions
(OSHD).
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whether such regulation could be of any help when put to other uses
against third-party manufacturers.
Administrative case law on OSHA demonstrates several issues
concerning safety standards which are relevant to industrial products liability. Certain standards may be too vague for application in
novel situations.9 Other standards may not have enough relevance to
safety to be enforceable.10 0 Some regulations, while relevant to
safety, may not suggest any feasible curative measures.101 It has been
99. See, e.g., Sante Fe Trail Trans. Co., 5 OSAHRC 840 (1973), in which the
Review Commission held a standard unenforceably vague. Separate opinions by each
commissioner, however, betray the difficulty of formulating a satisfactory standard
for the definition of vagueness. Commissioner VanNamee felt that a standard written
in broad terms should not be declared unenforcealby vague so long as "employers of
common intelligence are appraised of the conduct required of them." However,
VanNamee felt the standards which are "unlimited in spectrum, unlimited in scope
and application and which can be applied according to the whim of an area director
must fall." Id. at 842. Chairman Moran additionally felt that only specific, not vague,
standards furthered the purpose of OSHA in preventing accidents. Only regulations
clearly specifying certain required conditions or practices necessary for implementation of these practices could qualify as valid OSHA standards. Id. at 845.
Commissioner Cleary dissented. He felt that standards cannot often be expected to
prescribe required conduct in precise detail. Standards should have sufficient latitude
to encompass various employers with peculiar locations and circumstances. Id. at 848.
100. See, e.g., Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. United States Dept. of
Labor, 487 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1973). Here, an OSHA regulation setting a minimum
number of lavatories required for industries was attacked. The court affirmed the
purpose of Congress in 29 U.S.C. § 652(8), to limit the Secretary of Labor's discretion in
promulgating standards to those reasonably necessary for safety purposes.
101. See, e.g., Sheet Metal Specialty Co., 17 OSAHRC 212 (1975). A factory, cited
for failure to provide point of operation guards on a press brake, argued that such
guarding would be possible but inconvenient. As with the "vagueness" problem, see
note 99 supra, the commissioners disagreed about the vroper guidelines for finding
unfeasibility as an excuse for compliance. Van Namee believed that there should be a
violation as long as guarding of a machine was possible. Impossibility of compliance
might be a defense, but mere inconvenience would not be. Id. at 213-14. Commissioner
Clearly stated that, at most, impossibility of OSHA compliance was an affirmative
defense. Id. Moran dissented. Since a court below had concluded that compliance in
this case would virtually halt operations by disrupting production, compliance was not
mandatory. Id at 214-15.
On the relevance of industry custom and practice generally to OSHA standards,
see Brennan v. Smoke-Craft, Inc., 530 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1976). Compare these
considerations to the relevance of industry custom and practice in an industrial
products liability case, Rivera v. Rockford Mach. & Tool Co., 1111. App. 3d 641, 274
N.E.2d 828 (1971). Close reading of these and other cases suggests that the duty of
manufacturers to eliminate dangers, under strict liability, is stricter than the duty of
factories to eliminate the same dangers in the same machinery under OSHA. The
technological feasibility of making improvements may be more of an excuse for the
factory's non-compliance than it is for the machine manufacturer. Compare AFL CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1975) (OSHA case), with Capasso v. Minister
Mach. Co., 532 F.2d 952 (3d Cir. 1976) (strict liability case). Furthermore, while the
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suggested that these problems arise out of the haste with which the
regulatory scheme was adopted.102 Thus, certain standards may not be
reasonably necessary or bear enough relation to safety to merit
introduction as plaintiff's evidence in a third-party suit. Even if a
regulation is relevant to the safety of the machine in question,
efficacy and weight may be open to attack because of regulation
vagueness or unfeasibility. 0o
This can be illustrated by the
hypothetical punch press case. The punch press would probably be
subject to a detailed standard of safety dealing with "mechanical
power presses,"' 04 which includes many guarding requirements more
specific than those found in another general machine guarding
regulation. 0 5 Even so, the specific standard includes some general
terminology such as "point of operation" which might be too broad to
cost of making safety improvements is clearly a factor to be considered under OSHA
"feasibility" as discussed by the AFL - CIO case, such economic considerations may
receive sharp disapproval in the products liability context. See, eg., Brandon v. Yale &
Towne Mfg. Co., 220 F. Supp. 855, 861 (E.D. Pa. 1963), stating that "The plaintiff was
the unfortunate victim of an economic bargain which sacrificed his safety to the more
expedient needs of closing a sale to make a profit."
102. Moran, OccupationalSafety and Health Standards as Federal Law: The
Hazards of Haste, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 777 (1974). This article by OSHA Review
Commission Chairman Moran contains an excellent analysis of all problems of OSHA
efficacy as they relate to enforcement in OSHA's primary context.
Two recent developments may further affect the ultimate worth and efficacy of
OSHA standards for any purpose. First, bitter in-fighting among members of the
OSHA Review Commission has seriously damaged the integrity of that body's
opinions. See, e.g., Leone Constr. Co., 3 BNA Occ. Saf. & Health Cas. 1979 (Rev.
Comm'n 1976); D. Federico Co., 3 BNA Occ. Saf. & Health Cas. 1970 (Rev. Comm'n
1976). The background of the dispute may be gleaned from Fransisco Tower Services,
Inc., 3 BNA Occ. Saf. & Health Cas. 1952 (Rev. Comm'n 1976). To compound this
problem, the OSHA Review Commission has announced that it is not bound to follow
decisions of the circuit courts of appeals and will thus continue to follow its own
precedents. See Grossman Steel & Aluminum Corp., 4 BNA Occ. Saf. & Health Cas.
1185 (Rev. Comm'n 1976).
The other development is the granting of certiorari by the Supreme Court of the
United States in two cases, both involving the constitutionality of OSHA penalty
provisions. See Frank Irey Jr. Inc. v. OSAHRC, No. 75-748 (March 22, 1976); Atlas
Roofing Co., Inc. v. OSAHRC, No. 75-746 (March 22, 1976).
103. See note 101 supra. See also the discussion of feasibility concerns in the
strict liability context in note 192 infra.
104. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.217 (1975).
105. Id. § 1910.212. This general requirement cannot be applied to mechanical
power presses, such as the hypothetical punch press, because the more specific
standard controls. See Queen City Sheet Metal & Roofing, Inc., OSAHRC Docket No.
4322, 3 BNA Occ. Saf. & Health Cas. 1696 (Rev. Comm'n 1975). Conversely, when
there is no specific requirement for certain industrial machinery, the general
requirements apply. See Production Control Units, Inc., 2 BNA Occ. Saf. & Health Cas.
3294 (Rev. Comm'n 1975).
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encompass a specific problem. 106 There is also current debate about
the necessity and technological feasibility of certain parts of the
standard which outlaw presses that allow an operator to place his
hands into the die areas. 10 7 Thus, there may be serious questions about
whether certain regulations offer practical solutions to the machine
dangers alleged by plaintiff. Pointing out such questions of
vagueness and feasibility would aid defendant since the superficial
force and weight of the standard's face value would thereby be
reduced.
The applicability of the mechanical power press regulation to the
hypothetical punch press case is much clearer than many other
conceivable attempts to invoke OSHA in industrial machinery cases.
There is enough specificity in the requirements of the OSHA power
press standard to insure that many punch press injuries will be provided for directly. A large degree of unquestionable OSHA relevance
is thus a "given" in the hypothetical problem. This would not be the
case if the machine in question fell outside the sanctions of a specific
standard such as the power press regulation. The plaintiff would
then be forced to rely on the regulation setting out general
requirements for all machines. A new hypothetical must be
advanced to understand these special problems of efficacy, weigh
and relevance..
Consider, for example, a large automatic printing machine, with
all in-going rollers adequately shielded and electronically interlocked
to prevent their operation while the guards are open. On occasion it
may be normal and necessary for the operator to open the guards and
clean the rollers. The interlocking should prevent the rollers from
moving at this time. Suppose, however, that either from failure of the
106. The definitions generally applicable to 29 C.F.R. § 1910.217 are found at29
C.F.R. § 1910.211(d). Language such as the following could easily be construed as
vague in particular instances:
"Point of Operation" means the area of the press where material is actually
positioned and work is being performed during any process such as shearing,
punching, forming or assembling.
Id at § (45).
"Guard" means a barrier that prevents entry of the operator's hands or
fingers into the point of operation.
Id. at § (32).
107. See, e.g., AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1975). This litigation
arises from the Secretary of Labor's revocation of a strict standard which prohibited
machines which offered any possibility of press operators inadvertently placing their
hands into dies. There were questions about the original standard's feasibility and
technological possibility.
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complicated interlocking system or from some unexplainable cause
the rollers begin moving again and the operator's hand is injured. 08
If the plaintiff attempted to introduce the OSHA regulation on
general machine guarding requirements as evidence of defectiveness, questions of vagueness would arise. The regulation requires
"point of operation guarding" at "the area where work is actually
performed upon the material being processed."'1 9 The operator's
body is to be prevented from having any possible contact with "the
danger zone during the operating cycle." 0 While it may be admitted
that this regulation is applicable generally to printing presses, there
is a danger that it may greatly oversimplify the real issue in the
problem at hand. First of all, since the machine was adequately
guarded while it actually printed, it is at least arguable that there
were no unguarded "points of operation" involved. The operation of
the machine was automatic, and this automatic operation could not
even begin until the plaintiff was entirely removed from all "points of
operation." The plaintiff, on the other hand, would argue that his
servicing and cleaning of the machine, after the guard was open, was
a normal part of the machine's overall "operating cycle," carried on at
a definable "point of operation." The fact that the paper was
normally printed or "processed" through the roller forms the basis of
plaintiffs "point of operation" definition.
The word "operation" is thus the center of the controversy here,
since it leads to two divergent interpretations, both of which can be
supported by reference to the general regulation. Defendant would
contend that the machine was not performing its primary operating
purpose of printing at the time of the injury. It was shut off for
cleaning. Plaintiff would offer a definition of the word "operation"
based on his subjective sense of what he was doing. He was servicing
the machine, an "operation" necessary as part of his total job to keep
the machine in working order. This job was performed at the place
which would have been defined as the "point of operation" if the
machine were turned on.
The general OSHA regulation on machine guarding provides no
conclusive definition of the word "operate" in respect to this problem.
The total context of the regulation seems to imply that guarding is
necessary against certain obvious and recognized mechanical dan108. This hypothetical does not involve any question of the operator being in an
area of work outside of the primary work station. Cf. printing press hypothetical
in another article, supra note 44. See also Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng. Co., 138
N.J. Super. 344, 351 A.2d 22 (1976) (products liability case involving interlocking).
109. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.212(aX3Xi) (1975).
110. Id. § 1910.212(aX3Xii).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1976

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 1 [1976], Art. 3

66

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11

gers."' The printing press in question had none of these mechanical
dangers from moving parts while it was printing; these were
electrically guarded against. The failure then, if any, may have been
electrical in nature. Thus, the regulation is silent in two ways as to
the specific accident in issue. It is not clear, first of all, whether this
OSHA regulation contemplates the sort of electrical problem that
may be involved. Secondly, even if it could be said that the regulation
contemplates similar problems, it is not clear whether or not the
"guarding" requirement would provide any solution here. 112 Since
the machine was adequately shielded while turned on, the cause of
the accident was seemingly more subtle than lack of guarding.
What must be seen is that there is a continuum between the point
where an OSHA regulation is clearly relevant as to the problem in
question and the point where it is clearly inapplicable to the
particular machine and thus excludable. An example of the first
point would be the punch press which lacked guarding on moving
mechanical parts. An example of the latter would be the attempted
application of the general OSHA regulation on machine guarding to
an unguarded nozzle of an industrial drinking fountain, which
involves a different type of guarding covered in another regulation." 13
In cases falling in the middle of this continuum, as in the
printing press example, OSHA regulations may sometimes be
admitted as evidence of defectiveness since they are often ambiguous
enough to be at least superficially applicable. The danger of confusion
and prejudice to defendant's case increases here as the distance
between the complexity of the machine and the generality of the
regulation widens. At the extreme end of this continuum, relevancy
objections may be appropriate at the outset and call for complete
4
exclusion of the evidence."
111. See id §§ 1910.212(aX1), (4). It is recognized that "electronic safety devices"
are one method of guarding employees from hazards. Also recognized is the necessity
of interlocking "revolving drums" with the drive mechanism so that no revolution is
possible "unless the guard enclosure is in place." No details of electronic guarding
within the enclosure, however, are provided. Thus, it seems that the presence of such
an interlocking system, in conjunction with a mechanical guard, is enough to satisfy
this section's requirement. "Invisible" failures beyond this are not contemplated.
112. See, e.g., Production Control Units, Inc. 2 BNA Occ. Saf. & Health Cas. 3294,
3295 (Rev. Comm'n 1975), where citations against a factory were vacated because"none
of the methods of compliance established by the Secretary would enhance the safety of
employees using the machine." Cf. Jones v. Hittle Serv. Inc.,

__

Kan.

__,

549 P.2d

1383 (1976) (violation of standard must cause injury to be probative in products liability
context).
113. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.141(bXii) (1975).
114. Compare the relevancy standard used in OSHA's normal context, as stated
in National Ticket Co., 3 BNA Occ. Saf. & Health Cas. 1608 (Rev. Comm'n 1975), which
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If the defendant cannot have a regulation excluded from evidence
on the ground of irrelevancy, he may have two options for keeping alive
the issue of the standard's direct value. First, he may be able to
convince the judge that admission should only be conditional.11 5 If
plaintiff failed to connect the relevance of the regulation to the
accident with further evidence, the regulation could then be excluded. In the printing press hypothetical, for instance, defendant
could stress at a latter point that the plaintiff had failed to make clear
the element of causation. Compliance with the guarding requirements may not have prevented plaintiffs injury. The defendant's
second option would be to concede relevancy and direct all his
arguments toward diminishing the regulation's weight. Here, the
vagueness and generality of the regulation could be stressed. It
might also be shown that the original source of the code which OSHA
incorporated did not contemplate the precise type of machinery or the
degree of technological complexity in issue.
In summary, it may be said that a plaintiffs introduction of
OSHA into a third-party suit, whether as a basis of expert testimony
or as independent evidence, should not end discussion of the
regulations' efficacy. There are problems with both the vagueness of
certain standards and the irrelevance to safety. The defendant faced
with OSHA disparities should be prepared to study the history of
specific regulations closely in their primary context. Beyond the
interest in attacking the efficacy of OSHA when raised for plaintiffs
evidentiary purposes, however, there may be reasons for which the
defendant would affirmatively introduce OSHA evidence.
DEFENDANT'S USE OF

OSHA

A defendant in an industrial accident case might want to
introduce evidence of OSHA regulations for three purposes. First,
the defendant could show that the manufacture and design of his
product complies with the federal standard. This should be
permissible as long as defendant does not claim that OSHA
compliance is conclusive on his safety duty. Secondly, regulations
dealing with employee conduct might be introduced to evidence the
plaintiffs contributory negligence or assumption of risk. Although a
states that in order to sustain a factory's OSHA violation it must be shown that:
the employee was exposed to hazards which the standardswere intended to
prevent. In other words, it must be shown that it was reasonably foreseeable
that an injury might result from the employer's failure to comply with the
standard.
Id. at 1609 (emphasis added). See also Diamond Roofing Co. v. OSAHRC, 528 F.2d 645
(5th Cir. 1976).
115. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 133-35 (2d ed. 1974).
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novel use of safety regulations, this purpose too may be permissible as
long as defendant's purpose is only evidentiary. Finally, defendant
may argue that the existence of OSHA's sanctions on the factoryemployer has shifted the duty of correcting machine defects to the
factory. Although this argument invokes the basic purpose of OSHA's
existence, similar arguments based on past industrial safety codes
have failed.
To Show Compliance
A possible use of OSHA by defendant would be to show
compliance. Such compliance with OSHA cannot be conclusive on
defendant's safety duty since it is without the force of law in the case
at hand. A more limited purpose in admitting the safety regulation,
to evidence the defendant's due care toward the safety of his
machine, should nevertheless be permissible. The regulations may
be as probative of machine character and safety here as where the
plaintiff offers the regulations to evidence machine danger.116 There
may, however, be special hearsay dangers in admitting OSHA
regulations to evidence defendant's compliance. Certain regulations
may be unreliable from plaintiffs viewpoint if adopted from prior
codes considered favorable to industrial interests.
Whatever the cause of plaintiff's injury, OSHA compliance on the
part of the manufacturer cannot be an absolute defense to either the
negligence or strict liability claims. Just as the plaintiff in the thirdparty suit cannot claim that the regulations are conclusive on
defendant's duty, 17 the defendant cannot make them conclusive on
his duty of reasonable care. A reasonable manufacturer, depending
on the facts before him, might have to exercise even more care than
mere compliance with existing regulations." 8 A similar rationale is
applicable to the strict liability issue. "Unreasonable danger" is a
judicial standard which must be freely adaptable to particular fact
situations. It cannot be limited to any set of regulations. Furthermore,
the rule of strict liability applies even though the seller has exercised
all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product." 9 This
clearly forecloses the invocation of OSHA compliance as an absolute
defense.
See notes 59-63 supra and accompanying text.
See note 25 supra.
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C (1965):
Compliance With Legislation or Regulation
Compliance with a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation

116.
117.

does not prevent a finding of negligence where a reasonable man would take
additional precautions.
119. See note 8 supra.
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The view generally taken is that legislative safety regulations are
only "minimal" standards. 12 That courts often go beyond them and
fasten liability on defendants who have complied to the letter is
121
illustrated by recent cases under a number of federal regulations.
Of course compliance, though not conclusive, may be at least some
evidence that the manufacturer has exercised reasonable care' 22 or
that his product does not contain a particular unreasonable danger.
The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to suggest what the defendant
should have done beyond compliance. Absent such proof, compliance
could sometimes be evidence powerful enough upon which to base a
dismissal of plaintiff's case. 123 In no case, though, can the defendant
claim that the mere absence of an appropriate OSHA regulation
evidences performance of his legal duty.' 24
There may be some situations in which hearsay objections raised
by the plaintiff against any evidentiary use of OSHA compliance will
be appropriate. This is especially true when the regulations in question were adopted directly from a private safety code which may have
been originally promulgated by interests favorable to the defendant's
industry.'2 5 The source of OSHA regulations thus has a somewhat
more critical bearing when raised to show compliance than when
raised for the plaintiff's evidentiary purposes. This is because in the
compliance context, it can be claimed that the regulations, at least as
originally promulgated, are inherently self-serving. Even if not
120. See, e.g., Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 507 P.2d 653, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 45 (1973), wherein the court commented on compliance with warning standards
approved by the Food and Drug Administration:
Mere compliance with regulations or directives as to warnings... may not be
sufficient to immunize the manufacturer or supplier of the drug from
liability. The warnings required by such agencies may be only minimal in
nature and when the manufacturer or supplier knows of, or has reason to
know of, greater dangers not included in the warning, its duty to warn may
not be fulfilled.
Id. at 66, 507 P.2d at 661, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 53. See also the excellent analysis of the
compliance issue in Jones v. Hittle Serv. Inc., Kan. , 549 P.2d 1383 (1976).
121. Raymond v. Riegel Textile Corp., 484 F.2d 1025 (1st Cir. 1973); HubbardHall Chem. Co. v. Silverman, 340 F.2d 402 (5th Cir. 1965); Stevens v. Parke Davis, &
Co., 9 Cal. 51, 507 P.2d 653, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1973); Arcata v. Tonegato, 152 Cal.
App. 2d 837, 314 P.2d 130 (1957). Contra, Lewis v. Baker, 243 Ore. 317, 413 P.2d 400
(1966).
122. Arcata v. Tonegato, 152 Cal. App. 2d 837, 314 P.2d 130 (1957). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 288B2 (1965):

The unexcused violation of an enactment or regulation which is not so
adopted (as defining the standard of conduct of a reasonable man) may be
relevant evidence bearing on the issue of negligent conduct.
123. Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1973).
124. Jones v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 323 So. 2d 633 (Fla. App. 1976).
125. See note 66 supra.
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originally founded in such a private safety code, certain regulations
may have been watered down by interest group lobbying to the point
of meaninglessness. 126 A Washington case which admitted a private
safety code as showing some evidence of the manufacturer's conforming conduct inspired one of the strongest dissents ever written in
this entire area of safety code admission. 12 7 Plaintiffs should thus be
prepared to investigate the background and applicability of OSHA
regulations when offered against them and to undermine their
efficacy as demonstrated in the preceding section.
The use of OSHA regulations in the compliance area, then, will
probably follow current precedent holding them sometimes probative but never conclusive. A more novel affirmative use of OSHA by
defendants is discussed in the following section: to evidence plaintiffs
negligence or assumption of risk.
As Evidence of Contributory Negligence or Assumption of Risk
A good argument can be made that if OSHA regulations are to be
admissible evidence against the defendant, the spirit of objectivity
would be insured if applicable regulations bearing on employee
conduct are admissible on behalf of the defendant. Unlike almost all
previously existing safety codes, private or governmental, OSHA
1
explicitly creates duties for the employees as well as the employer. 28
Applicable regulations further articulating this duty may suggest a
course of conduct which, if it had been undertaken by plaintiff, might
have prevented his injury. Such regulations should be admissible
when clearly relevant, although it is doubtful that defendant could
claim that a plaintiff's breach is conclusive and an absolute defense to
liability. Even under OSHA employee-conduct regulations, primary
safety duties are often left upon the factory-employer.
126. See AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1975). This case,
concerning the controversy over the OSHA standard disallowing hands in press dies,
makes it clear that both industrial groups and organized labor are very interested in
the strictness with which regulations are defined and enforced.
127. Nordstrom v. White Metal Rolling & Stamping Corp., 75 Wash. 2d 629,453
P.2d 619 (1969) (Hale, J., dissenting):
In my opinion, the ASA code amounted to little more than an endorsement of
the ladder manufacturing industry, ladder merchants and representatives
from selected groups presuming to speak for users of the product. Although
providing useful information, this kind of sponsorship in commerce did not,
in my judgement, impart such a degree of reliability to the ASA safety
standards code as to warrant its admission over objection. As evidence, it
was and is palpable hearsay, and I see nothing in the majority opinion to
remove it from that category.
Id. at 639, 453 P.2d at 629. Compare the majority opinion at notes 83-85 supra.
128. 29 U.S.C. § 654(b) (1970).
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Before extending this argument further, it is appropriate to
consider a typical OSHA regulation related to both employer and
employee conduct and its possible ramifications in a third-party suit.
The OSHA regulation on occupational eye and face protection
provides and adequate example. 129 This regulation provides that
such eye and face protection shall be required where there is a
"reasonable probability" that its use will prevent injury.'30 In such
situations, employers shall make suitable protective equipment
conveniently available to employees, who then shall use the protectors. 13 1 Eye protectors, for instance, shall be provided where there
are hazards of flying objects, glare, liquids, injurious radiation, or a
combination of these dangers. 32 The language of this regulation
clearly puts the primary duty of making the equipment available on
the factory-employer. Once provided, however, the language of both
the OSHA statute and the regulations creates a duty on the part of
the employee to use the equipment.
The possible use of the eye and face protection regulation can be
illustrated by a hypothetical somewhat different from the punch
press problem. Here, the machine in question may have a flywheel or
other rapidly spinning apparatus. Such device throws a piece of
foreign matter into the plaintiffs eye. In plaintiffs subsequent suit
against the manufacturer, defendant might claim that plaintiff had
not been using a pair of safety glasses provided by the employer.
Defendant could argue that the recognized hazard as defined in the
OSHA regulations is some evidence of plaintiffs contributory
negligence or assumption of risk.
Although case authority in this area is sparse, evidentiary value
has been given to safety statutes similar to OSHA in their applica' Where employees have proceeded in
bility to employee conduct. 13
violation of provisions binding upon their conduct, such violation has
been held admissible as evidence of plaintiffs contributory negligence. 134 This should be the result in the hypothetical flywheel case,
since the employer had provided the glasses but the employee chose
not to use them. 35 In relation to an assumption of risk defense, the
129. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.133 (1975).
130. Id. § 1910.133(a).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Walsh v. Miehle-Goss-Dexter, Inc., 378 F.2d 409 (3d Cir. 1967); Bellefeuille
v. City & County Savings Bank, 374 N.Y.S.2d 781 (1975). Cf. Jasper v. Skyhook Corp.,
N.M. App. -, 547 P.2d 1140 (1976).
134. Walsh v. Miehle-Goss-Dexter, Inc., 378 F.2d 409 (3d Cir. 1967); Bellefeuille
v. City & County Savings Bank, 374 N.Y.S.2d 781 (1975).
135. See, e.g., Brennan v. OSAHRC, 511 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1975). Although this
is an action involving a citation of a factory for OSHA violations and not a civil action, it
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regulation could be evidence that the employee's conduct, whatever
its cause or justification, can be objectively viewed as involving a
recognized risk. This admission as "evidence of the risk" would be
similar to plaintiff's use of a machine guarding regulation as
evidence of dangerous machine character. 136 In either case, OSHA
regulations define risks and dangers which experience has shown
preventable.
Although the eye protection regulation might be used evidentially,
several factors would work against its being conclusive on employee
conduct. First, since the regulation puts the primary duty of
providing glasses on the employer, the degree with which this initial
duty has been executed might mitigate the employee's duty. This
would especially be the case if the employer never provided safety
glasses at all. Even where the employer has provided the glasses, the
duty under OSHA could conceivably extend to forcing employees to
wear them. 137 The use of the safety glass regulation as an absolute
defense could also be foreclosed by an employee's lack of actual
knowledge of the danger. Even if plaintiff had safety glasses and chose
not to use them, he may not have known the actual danger of the
flywheel.
Such knowledge of actual danger is central to the
assumption of risk defense to strict products liability. 138 The mere
existence of a regulation does not demonstrate this important element
of proof. Finally, it might generally be argued that the employee's
duty under OSHA is within the context of the employer-employee
relationship. Since it is thus not a duty owed to the third-party
manufacturer, the employee's non-compliance with OSHA can be
evidential but not conclusive in the products suit.
demonstrates that courts recognize employee duties under OSHA. The employer's
alleged violations arose from "individual employee choices of conduct." They were not
wearing the personal protective equipment provided them by the employer. The court
thus held that employer's OSHA violation must be vacated.
136. See note 88 supra.
137. As with many issues concerning the force of OSHA duties, this position has
been met with division of opinion among the Review Commissioners. See Weyerhaeuser
Co., 17 OSAHRC 362 (1975). The Commission ruled here, Chairman Moran dissenting,
that even though an employer had provided protective equipment, the employer's duty
had not been fulfilled. The employer's duty extended to "forcing" employees to use such
equipment.
138. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 447. See also the detailed analysis in Johnson v.
Clark Equip. Co.,

__

Ore.

-

, 547 P.2d 132 (1976).

The importance of the actual awareness element in the industrial accident
context may be leading to the erosion of the "patent defect rule," often the bane of
plaintiffs in products cases. The rule generally holds that the manufacturer may not
be liable for "open and obvious," in other words, "patent," dangers. See Micallef v.
Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571 (1976), overruling Cambo v. Scofield, 301
N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950).
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A defendant who intends to raise the issue of OSHA regulations
bearing on employee conduct should also be aware that some courts
have subtly eroded employee conduct-related defenses. An employee's violation of a safety regulation, for instance, may be
excusable if the plaintiff proceeded in the face of the danger because
of a command from his employer.3 9 The employee's "obligation to do
his job" may thus be as relevant as safety considerations. 140 In
a case bearing some resemblance to the safety glasses hypothetical, it
has been suggested that an employee's "economic complusion" might
make the running of known risks reasonable for him.' 4' Obviously, if
such language were ever widely followed, there would for all
practical purposes no longer be an assumption of risk defense in
industrial accident cases. Though such expressions are unusual, they
are offered to illustrate what could be an undercurrent of judicial
feeling in this area of liability4 2 "Economic compulsion" arguments
are what defense lawyers might face if they begin pressing OSHA's
employee conduct provisions as absolute defenses.
At best, then, the defendant will probably be able to evidence
employee conduct only narrowly with OSHA regulations. Any
question of the efficacy, vagueness, or direct applicability of a
particular regulation to employee conduct will probably call for its
complete exclusion. 43 Within the limits discussed, however, defendant should be allowed to use directly applicable regulations
against plaintiff where the limited evidentiary purpose is made clear.
Allowing defendants to do this could help balance the overall effect of
OSHA introduction into third-party suits. It would be rather
inconsistent for a jurisdiction recognizing plaintiff-oriented safety
code evidence to disallow the defendant's use outlined here.
Summarizing, at least two possible uses of OSHA regulations
should be open to third-party industrial defendants: first, as some
139. Walsh v. Miehle-Goss-Dexter, Inc., 378 F.2d 409 (3d Cir. 1967). Contra,
Bellefeuille v. City & County Savings Bank, 374 N.Y.S.2d 781 (1975).
140. Walsh v. Miehle-Goss-Dexter, Inc., 378 F.2d 409 (3d Cir. 1967); Independent
Nail and Packing Co. v. Mitchell, 343 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1965).
141. Independent Nail & Packing Co., v. Mitchell, 343 F.2d 819, 823 (5th Cir.
1965) (Aldrich, C.J., concurring). While building a barn for his employer, a worker was
blinded when a nail fragmented and struck his eye. There was evidence that employees
were not wearing safety glasses, even though they knew that 5%of the nails used were
breaking. See also Deem v. Woodbine Mfg. Co., 89 N.M. 50, 546 P.2d 1207 (1976);
Johnson v. Clark Equip. Co., Ore. , 547 P.2d 132 (1976).
142. The assumption of risk defense may suggest the harsh defenses employees
faced at common law when trying to recover for industrial injuries from their
employers. See PROSSER, supra note 4, at 450-53, 525-30.
143. Mitchell v. Mach. Center, Inc., 297 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1961).
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evidence of compliance with existing standards, and second, in clear
cases of regulation applicability, as evidence regarding plaintiff's
contributory negligence or assumption of risk. Both of these
affirmative uses of OSHA by defendant and the previously discussed
affirmative uses of OSHA by plaintiff are evidentiary. A third
possible use of OSHA by defendant, however, would involve basic
questions of the policies and duties implied by OSHA's existence as a
whole. This third and final purpose of OSHA invocation by
defendant would be the claim that OSHA has, in certain cases,
shifted the ultimate safety duty from the machine manufacturer to
the factory-employer.
Attempts to Shift Ultimate Safety Duty upon the Factory-Employer
Up to this point, the concern of this note has been with
evidentiary uses of OSHA regulations. The plaintiff will probably be
able to use them as a basis of expert testimony and possibility as
evidence of negligence or machine dangerousness. The defendant
may be able to evidence compliance to some extent short of making
such compliance conclusive on his duty. Defendant's use of the
regulations to show plaintiff's contributory negligence or assumption
of risk will also be purely evidentiary.
If OSHA represents anything, however, it stands as a broad affirmation of the safety duty within the industrial environment. This
duty, to provide a safe workplace and follow all regulations pertinent
144
thereto, is set solidly on the shoulders of the factory-employer.
OSHA was not promulgated for the purpose of being an evidentiary
tool, even though evidentiary side effects may be permissible. Since
duties of third-party manufacturers were left unstated in OSHA, it is
arguable that Congress sensed that the primary responsibility for
industrial safety was best placed elsewhere.
The question is whether defendant in a third-party suit can raise
these overall safety policies and duties implied by OSHA to shift the
duty of repairing defects from himself. This problem may often arise
where the litigation concerns machinery older than OSHA itself. In
the punch press hypothetical, for instance, the absence of proper
safety guards evidences not only the fault of the manufacturer but
also the direct violation of OSHA by the factory-employer. If the
machine had been in the factory's control for a long time, the factory's
violation may seem to be a cause of injury which has intervened and
superseded the earlier culpability of the manufacturer. However,
144.

29 U.S.C. § 654(aXi) (1970).
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courts have rejected this argument with other safety codes; it should
likewise fail with OSHA. A manufacturer's safety duty is considered
non-delegable. Dangerous instrumentalities, once injected into the
flow of commerce, continue as possible causes of injury despite the
"negative acts" of factories.
The position that a safety statute shifts the ultimate safety duty
upon the factory-employer was adopted by the New Jersey Court
of Appeals in 1971. In Bexiga v. Havir Manufacturing Corporation,145 a statute in force at the time a power press was manu146
factured placed a duty upon the factory to provide safety guards.
Thus, the statute was similar to OSHA's sections on employer-related
duties. The court held that the manufacturer could rely on this
statutory "custom" within the industry and was relieved of strict
liability. 147 This decision was criticized as undermining the policy of
strict liability, since the statute was read to limit the worker's
recovery to workmen's compensation benefits and to place sole
responsibility on the factory.148 The Supreme Court of New Jersey
ultimately reversed for the reason that public policy requires
manufacturers to take responsibility for the safety of their products. 49 Custom could at best be evidentiary, not conclusive, and the
statute did not give the manufacturer the right to rely on the factoryemployer's compliance as a matter of law. 15° In essence, this means
-that the manufacturer is held to the foreseeability of his purchasers
5
breaking the law.' '
One of the few reported cases dealing with the admissibility of
OSHA regulations is in accord with Bexiga. In Scott v. Dreis and
Krump Manufacturing Co.,12 a 1975 Illinois case, a defendant's
attempt to introduce an OSHA regulation on press guarding'5 for
the purpose of delegating the duty of installation upon the factoryemployer was held properly refused.' 54 The court held that the
manufacturer's duty to incorporate safety devices in a design that is
145. 114 N.J. Super. 397, 276 A.2d 590 (1971), rev'd, 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 881
(1972).
146. Law of 1904, ch. 64, § 13, p. 156, (C.S. p. 3026, § 28], as amended Law of
1912, ch. 6, § 1, p. 21, [1924 Supp. § 107-28], Law of 1904, ch. 64, § 30, p. 61, [C.S. p. 3030
§ 45], repealed and superseded, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34: 6A-3.
147. 114 N.J. Super. at 403-04, 276 A.2d at 593.
148. Comment, 25 RUT. L. REV. 733 (1971).
149. Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 NJ. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972).
150. Id. at 410, 290 A.2d at 285-86.
151. Id. See also Rhoads v. Service Mach. Co., 329 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Ark.
1971).
152. 26 Il1. App. 3d 971, 326 N.E.2d 74 (1975).
153. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.217(cXl) (1975).
154. 26 Ill. App. 3d at 988, 326 N.E.2d at 85.
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not "unreasonably dangerous" is non-delegable. 1'
Where appropriate safety devices had never been provided the factory, the court
noted, the defendant's attempt to delegate its safety duty to the factory
would inject an improper conclusion of law on the strict liability
issue. 1
On the surface, the "non-delegable duty" concept does not seem
very revolutionary. It is closely related to familiar concepts of
causation. 157 A later failure of the factory-employer to install devices
does not interrupt the negligence and strict liability of the manufacturer. The earlier "wrong" of the manufacturer is simply allowed
to continue unchecked as a possible cause of injury. In the context of
both strict liability and the generally long life span of industrial
machinery, however, the application of this concept can produce
startling results.
Balido v. Improved Machinery, Inc.,158 a 1973 California appellate court decision, is one of the most far-reaching of all third-party
industrial accident cases. It incorporates most of the evidentiary issues discussed up to this point and suggests the ultimate
questions of duty and policy. The Balido plaintiff was injured when a
plastic injection molding press closed on her hand while she was
making an adjustment. The machine had been manufactured in 1950
and the injury occurred in 1965. At the time of manufacture, a
California industrial safety order was in effect. It was binding on
factories which used machinery and not on manufacturers. The safety
order required more guarding devices on the machine than the
defendant had originally installed.
The defendant-manufacturer apparently learned of the relevance
of the industrial order after the machine was already sold. Significantly, on three separate occasions, the defendant undertook to warn
the factory-employer of the machine's non-compliance with state
safety standards. At one point, the defendant offered the required
machine guarding for sale to the factory. 159 The factory, however,
never purchased the necessary machine guarding from anyone, and
thus the machine was substantially the same the day of injury as it
was when sold fifteen years earlier. The plaintiff sued the
manufacturer on the theories of negligence, warranty, and strict
155. Id.
156. Id. Although the court would not allow use of the OSHA regulation by
defendant to delegate duty, it recognized that the same regulation might be admitted
for plaintiffs evidentiary purposes.
157. See, e.g., PROSSER, supra note 4, at 177.
158. 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1973).
159. Id. at 639, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
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liability. Defendant conceded negligent design for the purposes of
nonsuit, which the trial court granted.
The appellate court reversed. First, the industrial safety order
was held to be probative evidence of deficient design, even though it
was directed to the factory and not the manufacturer. 160 Second, the
factory's notice of both the danger and the safety statute did not
create a superseding negligence which relieved the third-party from
liability as a matter of law. Relying on Bexiga, the court held that
whether or not the manufacturer should have foreseen the factory's
disregard of law was a question of fact.161 Finally, the "lapse of time" of
did not make an
over fifteen years since the machine's manufacture
62
absolute defense and was also a question of fact.
It does not seem that the manufacturer in Balido could have
avoided liability in any way except by giving away the safety devices
free to the factory. Such was the result, even though it was the
factory's primary responsibility to install, and presumably to pay for,
such devices under the statute. In light of an earlier case presenting
an almost identical situation, it is even questionable whether giving
the device away free would have absolved the manufacturer of
responsibility.'16 He might even have been required to personally
install it.164 One can only speculate as to the result if the manufacturer
had in fact come personally to the factory with the machine guarding
but had been refused entrance. Under the principles of responsibility
and causation that these cases rely on, the manufacturer's liability
presumably would have continued. Such a result could be no more
unfair to the third-party defendant than the result in Balido.
The role the safety regulation plays here is subtle. Seemingly, the
greatest force it can have for whatever reason it is offered in the
third-party suit is evidentiary. Thus, when defendant attempts to
invoke it for something more he must fail. All uses of safety
160. Id. at 642, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
161. Id. at 646-47, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
162. d. at 645, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 898.
163. lteichel v. Lima-Hamilton Corp., 98 F. Supp. 232 (N.D. Ohio 1951).
164. i1. In this extraordinary case, a state statute similar to both OSHA and the
industrial .afety order in Balido required the factory to install certain machine
guards. A manufacturer, sued on a negligence theory for failing to provide such
guards, claimed that the factory's violation of statute was an intervening cause of
injury.

This claim was even stronger than the defendant's in Balido. The Heichel

manufacturer actually provided the necessary guards to the factory, which the factory
refused to install. It was held that the manufacturer's liability continued; his duty
extended to installing the guard. The case relied on the same theories of causation
discussed at note 157 supra. The original injury-causing "force" put in operation by
defendant had merely continued unchecked.
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standards in third-party suits examined here stop short of giving the
standard a conclusive effect. Since it is without the force of law in the
suit at hand, plaintiff cannot claim that defendant has a duty to
comply with the statute. The safety code may thus give plaintiff an
evidentiary tool, but not a cause of action. Conversely, the defendant is
foreclosed from invoking the standard as conclusive either on his
compliance or plaintiffs conduct.
The central problem, however, is that the safety code was
promulgated to be more than an evidentiary tool. Defendant's
argument that the safety duty has shifted, though inconsistent with
metaphysical concepts of causation, goes to the heart of the standard's
purpose. OSHA's basic purpose is the improvement of industrial
safety at the point the legislature presumably felt such problems
could most directly be met: within the employer-employee relationship.1r5 Before the advent of products liability law, a common defense
to the privity barrier against third-party suits was that safety codes,
as opposed to random litigation, were the best method for effectuating safety policies. 166 At that time, of course, safety thinking was
still primitive and strict products liability had not yet been conceived.
Now, both comprehensive safety codes and third-party litigation
have become commonplace. When safety codes are used evidentially
within the context of third-party litigation, however, the code's basic
purpose is not in issue.
The possibility that there might be a conflict between existing
policies is not often discussed directly by the courts. The decisions
may be best explained, although the courts do not mention it, by
recognizing that to agree with the defendant that the statute shifts
the duty to the factory-employer would leave plaintiff a limited
Plaintiff would be held to whatever remedies
compensation.
workmen's compensation provides. This was suggested by the
dissent in Balido.167 It was the opinion of the dissenter that the court
was, in effect, fashioning a new policy of workmen's compensation in
opposition to the dictates of the legislature. 16
In summary, a defendant's attempt to invoke OSHA to shift the
safety duty upon the factory-employer will probably be disallowed on
165. See notes 19 and 31 supra.
166. See, e.g., Valeri v. Pullman Co., 218 F. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1914).
167. Balido v. Improved Mach. Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633,650, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890,
901 (1973) (Compton, J., dissenting).
168. Id. Concluding a discussion of Balido, another writer states: "The
manufacturer finds himself in an unenviable position rather like that of a drowning
man whose neighbor owes him no legal duty to do an affirmative act which would save
his life." Mitchell, Products Liability, Workmen's Compensationand the Industrial
Accident, 14 DuQ. L. REv. 349, 376 (1976).
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the basis of similar decisions. Strict liability holds the manufacturer
to a non-delegable duty of selling a product which is not unreasonably
dangerous. While this concept must overlook the basic focus of the
safety code, it is at least consistent with the non-conclusive force the
statute has when introduced for other purposes. It is possible,
however, that recent developments in strict products liability law are
expanding the scope of defendant's safety duty. In conjunction with
safety code use, these developments could in some jurisdictions imply
an almost conclusive effect of the standard on defendant's duty by its
mere admission into evidence by plaintiff.
OSHA AND THE EXPANDING DUTIES OF
PRODUCT MANUFACTURERS

Recent developments in products liability are expanding the
conception of a manufacturer's safety duty. In some instances,
evidence of technological improvements may be admissible to set
standards for machinery manufactured prior to such advances. This
development could have a great impact on the uses of OSHA
regulations in third-party suits. A regulation, admitted for plaintiffs
purely "evidentiary" purposes, might by its very existence imply a
duty of manufacturers to improve machinery previously sold. Thus,
though defendant may be barred from discussing the overall safety
duties and policies which are the focus of the statute, plaintiffs
reference to the same code may automatically imply an expanded
duty of defendant. Such an effect was formerly not possible with
safety code admission, since a prerequisite to their relevancy was
their existence at the time of manufacture. This limitation, however,
may be applicable only to negligence cases and not to the modern
theory of strict liability.
Time of StandardPromulgation
As a prerequisite to the relevance of a safety code offered into
evidence, the plaintiff may first have to demonstrate that the
standards were in existence at the time of manufacture and not
promulgated later. 169 The "time of standards promulgation" has thus
been left a variable in the punch press hypothetical. If the punch
169. Muncie Aviation Corp. v. Party Doll Fleet, Inc., 518 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir.
1975); Mahoney v. Roper-Wright Mfg., 490 F.2d 229 (7th Cir. 1973); Vroman v. Sears

Roebuck & Co., 387 F.2d 732 (7th Cir. 1967); Wenzell v. M.T.D. Prod., Inc., 32 Ill. App.
3d 279, 336 N.E.2d 125 (1975); Dominick v. Brockton-Tauton Gas Co., 356 Mass. 669,
255 N.E.2d 370 (1970); Lemery v. O'Shea Dennis, Inc., 112 N.H. 199, 291 A.2d 616
(1972); Rodrigues v. Elizabethtown Gas Co., 104 N.J. Super. 436, 250 A.2d 408 (1969).
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press was manufactured after the specific OSHA regulation was in
existence, in 1975 for instance, there is no such problem presented. If
manufactured in 1960, however, the regulation may not be admissible at all under the traditional operation of the rule.
The rationale for the limitation is that any other result would be
"totally unreasonable" because the standard would thus be retroactive in effect. 170 This rationale is probably consistent with the
concept of negligence, and when products liability cases rest solely on
that ground the limitation will undoubtedly continue. It would be
unfair to give retroactive effect to a standard in negligence cases
because of the reasonable man standard. A reasonable manufacturer
is judged by what knowledge he should have had and incorporated
into products at the time of manufacture. 171 In rare cases, entire
industries may have lagged behind necessary safety developments and
be required to implement them. 172 Even so, the requirement is to be
are necessary and not of specific codes
aware of what improvements
173
not yet in existence.
Even the most far-reaching industrial accident cases examined here, Bexiga and Balido, have not gone beyond this limitation. In
both cases, the specific regulations discussed as evidence of negligence or defectiveness were in effect at the time of manufacture. The
defendant was thus held only to what he knew or should have known
at that time. The traditional limitation is thus inherent in Bexiga and
Balido, and only few cases have suggested that the limitation no
longer applies. 174 This "time of standards promulgation" limitation
case involving the attempted
has been recognized in a negligence
175
admission of an OSHA regulation.
170. Bell v. Buddies Super-Market, 516 S.W.2d 447, 449 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
171. Vroman v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 387 F.2d 732, 737 (7th Cir. 1967); Bell v.
Buddies Super-Market, 516 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
172. See, e.g., The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
173. Defendants are charged with knowledge of existing customs, practices, and
developments within industry at the time of manufacture. Safety codes, if relevant,
are considered evidence of such general knowledge. Thus, if not yet existent, they
could not logically evidence such knowledge. See Muncie Aviation Corp. v. Party Doll
Fleet, Inc., 519 F.2d 1178, 1181 (5th Cir. 1975); Vroman v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 387
F.2d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1967).
174. One of the few recent cases suggesting the real weakness of the time of
standards promulgation limitation is Simms v. Southwest Texas Methodist Hosp.
535 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976). This court's reasons for excluding a subsequent
safety regulation are not convincing. It ties the policy reasons for exclusion to the same
policy reasons which, when used to exclude subsequent design changes in strict
liability, are beginning to fall by the wayside. See notes 186-90 infra and accompanying text.
175. Bell v. Buddies Super-Market, 516 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
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In two situations, however, ultimate questions of safety code
admissibility will be reached. First, some OSHA regulations already
in existence or yet to be promulgated may create technological
requirements that are new. Second, in cases of certain older
machines, not even the pre-existing code which OSHA restates may
have been in existence at the time of manufacture. In either case,
attempts may be made to hold the manufacturer to a codified
technological standard not available to him when the allegedly
dangerous machine was designed and sold.
Although the traditional approach from existing case law
indicates that plaintiffs will be unsuccessful in admitting new OSHA
regulations or any other new standards, it is nevertheless possible
that the standards may yet be admissible. The theory of strict
liability may not contain the same limitations on legal responsibility
which are inherent in negligence. The concept is very new to the
products field, and the temptation has often been to apply it in ways
closely analagous to the negligence concept which the judges already
knew. 176 For a while, certain "time-related" defenses available to
defendants in negligence suits were also made available to strict
liability defendants. A "time-related" defense in this context means
one which allows the defendant to limit the discussion to the custom,
practice and technological capability of his industry at the time of
manufacture. Recent strict liability decisions which strike these
defenses down may ultimately open the door to evidence of safety
codes promulgated after manufacture and thus accordingly allow a
new evidentiary basis of liability.
The Disappearanceof Time-Related Strict Liability Defenses
The admission of safety codes promulgated after product manufacture, though inconsistent with negligence, may be consistent with
the policy of strict liability. This conclusion is reached by analogy to
recent decisions in the strict liability context which hold negligencerelated defenses and exclusionary rules inapplicable to the new
theory. Defenses based on the custom or state of the art at the time of
manufacture, if given effect in strict liability, have been said to
emasculate the doctrine in effect. Such defenses would hold the
manufacturer only to what he could have known at the time of sale.
The "unreasonably dangerous" standard may carry no such inherent
limitation. Further, post-accident design changes in a product may
become admissible evidentially against the defendant. Strict liability may thus imply a continuing duty upon the manufacturer to
176. See note 189 infr.
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update previously sold machinery. With the rationale excluding the
admission of new technology in strict liability cases thus undermined,
there should no longer be a bar to the admissibility of safety codes
promulgated after manufacture.
The rule of strict liability may not inherently foreclose the
consideration of new technology. A basic limitation of the rule is that
it applies only where the product is unreasonably dangerous when it
leaves the manufacturer's hands. 177 This, however, leaves open the
question of whether "unreasonable danger" is defined by the standards and knowledge available at the time of sale or later on. In the
hypothetical punch press case, for instance, a condition may be
present at the time it leaves the seller's hands. This condition may not
be generally considered "unreasonably dangerous" until fifteen years
later. Present standards, including OSHA regulations, would be
useful to the plaintiff in defining the unreasonable danger in light of
present technology. Obviously, if old customs and "states of the art"
were a defense to the strict liability question, these latest standards
would be completely irrelevant and prejudicial. The plaintiff will be
bound to discuss the machine in terms of what a well-informed
manufacturer would have known at the earlier time, not what he
would know later. A negligence basis of a custom or "state of the art"
defense is implicit. Strict liability, however, applies even though the
manufacturer exercised all possible care. 178
Although some courts have held the state of the art defense viable
in strict liability suits, 79 other decisions have recognized that to allow
the defense would be to "emasculate" the doctrine of strict liability
and in effect to return to a pure negligence theory.18 In a 1970 strict
liability case involving an allegedly dangerous blood serum, it was
conceded that there were absolutely no means by which the existence
of a dangerous virus could be detected in the serum under the present
state of medical science.' 8 ' This technological impossibility was held
to be of "absolutely no moment" to the liability of the hospital which
administered the serum. 182 The same rationale was adopted in an
177.

See note 8 supra.

178. Id
179. Larson v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); Dyson v.
General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor
Corp., 503 S.W.2d 516 (Tenn. 1973).
180. See, e.g., Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 Ill. 2d 443, 266
N.E.2d 897 (1970).
181. Id
182. Id. at 455, 266 N.E.2d at 903. Any other ruling, the court felt, would have
been entirely inconsistent with the policy of strict liability. For an excellent discussion
of the far-reaching ramifications Cunningham may have on the industrial manu-
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industrial accident context three years later. In Gelsumino v. E. W.
Bligs Co., 83 the fact that an allegedly dangerous punch press foot
pedal might have been in complete conformity with the state of the
art at time of manufacture was held completely irrelevant to the
strict liability issue. 8 4 With regard to negligence, it was relevant but
not conclusive.8 3
Strict liability may also open the way for consideration of
subsequent repairs or design improvements in products. In a recent
case involving the design of an International Scout jeep, Ault v.
International Harvester Co., 8s the California Supreme Court held
post-accident design improvements relevant to a strict liability suit.
Social policies in favor of excluding such evidence, such as the
encouragement of the manufacturer to actually improve his design,
were thought relevant to negligence actions only. 8 7 What this means,
in effect, is that the court which first formulated strict products
liability has now admitted that the doctrine does not have the
furtherance of products safety as its primary goal.'18 It is a tool for
facturer, see Patterson, Products Liability: The Manufacturer's Continuing Duty to
Improve His Product or Warn of Defects After Sale, 62 ILL. B.J. 92 (Oct. 1973).
183. 10 Ill.
App. 3d 604, 295 N.E.2d 110 (1973).
184. Id. at 609, 295 N.E.2d at 113.
185. Id.
186. 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, Cal. Rptr. 812 (1975), vacating 10 Cal.3d
337, 515 P.2d 313, 110 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1973).
187. The court in Ault indicated:
[C]ourts and legislatures have frequently retained the exclusionary rule in
negligence cases as a matter of "public policy," reasoning that the exclusion
of such evidence may be necessary to avoid deterring individuals from
making improvements or repairs after an accident has occurred....
When the context is transformed from a typical negligence setting to the
modern products liability field, however, the "public policy" assumptions
justifying this evidentiary rule are no longer valid. The contemporary mass
producer of goods, the normal products liability defendant, manufactures
tens of thousands of units of goods; it is manifestly unrealistic to suggest that
such a producer will forego making improvements in its product, and risk
innumerable additional lawsuits and the attendant adverse effect upon its
public image, simply because evidence of adoption of such improvement may
be admitted in an action founded on strict liability for recovery on an injury
that preceded the improvement.... [T]he exclusionary rule... does not affect
the conduct of the mass producer of goods, but merely serves as a shield
against potential liability.
13 Cal. 3d at 119-20, 528 P.2d at 1152-52, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 815-16 (emphasis added).
188. Id. It should be seen here that the encouragement of product improvement
does not weigh as heavily with the court as the policy of making the manufacturer pay.
In the next paragraph, however, the court says that the exclusionary rule may be
inconsistent with the public policy "of encouraging the distributor of mass-produced
goods to market safer products." 528 P.2d at 1152. The only way to understand this
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fastening liability and distributing losses, first and foremost, and
other considerations are only side effects. This analysis is perhaps
best illustrated by the confusion of courts that adopt strict liability
yet try to keep old defenses and limitations of it alive.18 9
Ultimately, the disappearance of time-related defenses to strict
liability adds support to the developing concept of a product
manufacturer's "continuing duty."' 90 This continuing duty is to be
aware of dangerous propensities in previously manufactured products and to correct such deficiencies. 191 The concept goes beyond
what is generally required under negligence since the defendant may
now be held to technological standards unknown and unknowable at
the time of manufacture.1'9
seeming paradox is to see the encouragement policy as secondary to the primary policy
of spreading losses. The loss-spreading policy obviously operates in every successful
strict liability suit. The safety encouragement policy is considered a side effect which
will hopefully follow. In particular cases, however, the secondary effect will not result.
Some product manufacturers may be driven out of business if forced to bear interim
economic burdens too crippling to pass on. At this point, they can no longer market
safer products since they are out of business. The policy of "not shielding them from
liability," however, will then have been served.
189. See, e.g., Jones v. Hutchinson Mfg., Inc., 502 S.W.2d 66 (Ky. App. 1973). The
Jones case is criticized in Comment, Is 402A Strict Liability Really Strict in
Kentucky?, 62 Ky. L. REV. 866 (1973), the writer taking issue with the intrusion of
negligence concepts in strict liability. See note 8 supra.
190. See Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 219 F. Supp. 556 (D. Del. 1963). In this
case, concerning the design of a propeller system, the "continuing duty" concept was
first formulated. See also Recent Developments, A Manufacturer'sContinuingDuty to
Improve Product, 27 OHIo L. J. 746 (1966).
191. See note 182 supra.
192. See note 173 supra.
Questions of the "feasibility" of arguments made by products liability plaintiffs
often underscore some aspect of the technological possibility problem. In concluding a
discussion of the Cronin case, note 8 supra, Dean Keeton stated:
Whether or not the scientific unknowability of the risk should be a roadblock
to recovery is another question. If it is,- then as the Supreme Court of
California suggests, strict liability as to design defects is virtually a myth.
This is not to say that negligence should be a prerequisite to recovery when
the claim is based on the ground that the product was improperly designed.
It is only to say that the courts must face the issue squarely and decide
whether or not negligence is or is not to be a prerequisite to recovery.
Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 39 (1973).
The "facing up" to the ramifications of strict liability may be a goal yet to be
realized, even in jurisdictions where appellate forums have attempted to lead the
way. See Baker v. Chrysler Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 710, 127 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1976)
(holding that plaintiff must show the "reasonableness" of alternative designs where a
design defect is claimed); Buccery v. General Motors Corp., 132 Cal. Rptr.
605, 614 (Cal. App. 1976) (stating that the design defect in issue was "readily
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Gelsumino, Ault, and the concept of continuing duty should have
far-reaching effects on the admission of OSHA regulations by
plaintiff to evidence unreasonable danger. First of all, if the state of
the art defense is irrelevant and later design changes are admissible,
there is obviously no longer any barrier to the admission of evidence
concerning new technology generally to define "unreasonable danger." This means that regulations such as OSHA should be
admissible whenever promulgated, before or after manufacture.
Such a result is consistent with the strict liability policy of Gelsumino
and Ault. Indeed, it would be strange to distinguish the admission of
later design changes from the admission of later safety regulations.
Both may reflect technologies and sources of comparison unknowable
by defendant at the time of manufacture.
Second, not only is an evidentiary barrier to admission of
certain safety codes gone, but also new duties are placed upon
manufacturers of industrial machinery. The very definitions provided by OSHA and other regulations imply an expanded duty of
accident prevention upon the manufacturer by the very fact of their
existence. That duty, in short, is to be aware of current standards of
safety as applicable to previously manufactured machinery. Nothing
short of this, together with bringing the previously manufactured
machinery up to date by providing and installing currently required
safety features, will relieve the manufacturer from his "continuing
duty." Not even this may relieve his liability for, as we have seen,
compliance can at best be evidential, not conclusive. 193
This "duty," of course, is completely unrealistic and would be
impossibly burdensome for the manufacturer to meet, because the
duty does not have as its primary rationale the encouraging of 'the
safe manufacture of products. The Ault decision strongly implies
this. Only negligence, which invokes ideas about the distribution of
fault and responsibility in society, is concerned with a duty which
preventable through the employment of existing technology" at economical costs). The
question is whether or not these decisions have faced up to Ault. See also McClellan v.
Chicago Transit Authority, 34 Il1.App. 3d 151,340 N.E.2d 61,63 (1975) (statingthat the
factors of "cost, practicality, and technological possibility" must be shown in strict
liability design cases to show that alternative designs are feasible). The question is
whether or not this decision has faced up to Cunningham
Where negligence concepts enter into strict liability and "feasibility" is thus a
factor in the relevance of profferred evidence, it is probable that OSHA regulations,
though generally admissible, will not be allowed where they set technological
requirements unknown at the time of manufacture. This result seems implicit in Bunn
v. CaterpillarTractor Co., 415 F. Supp. 286 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
193. See notes 116-27 supra and accompanying text.
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really exists.' M The "continuing duty" in strict liability cases is an
artificial concept imposed for the purpose of making somebody else
pay. 195 It is concerned not with the distribution of fault and duty but
with distributing losses.
In summary, absent a chance of establishing the assumption of
risk defense in a particular case, an industrial products manufacturer's liability is absolute if new doctrines are straightforwardly
applied. Strict liability simplifies the route to the manufacturer's
liability. Negligence or fault need not be proved. The central burden
of proof remaining to plaintiff, proof of the machine's unreasonable
danger, may then be greatly simplified by OSHA regulations and
similar codes. With the disappearance of negligence and its related
defenses, the very existence of safety codes may imply expanding
At the same time, such
duties of third-party manufacturers.
manufacturers are foreclosed from invoking the basic focus of OSHA
as a shield to liability. Manufacturers may thus be liable for injuries
caused by old machines which do not meet present definitions of
safety. Ironically the employer, who carries the primary OSHA
safety duty, cannot be so liable. The defendant-manufacturer's
problem, however, must not be seen as one having to do with
evidentiary rules which may permit admission of OSHA or similar
codes. The still developing concept of strict liability, as a course of
recovery in the industrial context, is the real problem for defendant.
CONCLUSION

The growing use of OSHA regulations by both the plaintiffemployee and the defendant-manufacturer in third-party industrial
suits seems inevitable. OSHA represents a terminology and manner
of dialogue about the industrial workplace which cannot practically
be excised. Further, the current dialogue in OSHA administrative
decisions follows some of the same general lines present in industrial
products litigation. Plaintiff should be able to introduce applicable
regulations as a basis of expert testimony and to evidence defendant's
negligence and dangerous machine character. Defendant's use of
certain regulations to evidence compliance and plaintiffs contributing conduct may also be permissible.
Whenever regulations are offered into evidence, the efficacy of
such standards should be closely scrutinized by the opposing party.
194. See Donnelly, After the Fall of the CitadeL Exploitation of the Victory or
Consideration of All Interests?, 19 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1 (1967).
195. Id. at 30. But see the pointed defense of the use of products suits by
industrial workers in Wagner, Eliminate Industrial Worker's Products Suits?ATLA's Response, 19 A.T.L.A. NEws L. 97 (April 1976).
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OSHA, in its primary context of enforcing safety measures on the
factory-employer, has been vulnerable to challenges of regulation
vagueness and feasibility. Even where regulations are relevant,
these problems could be pointed out in an effort to reduce the weight
accorded to them. As the distance between the generality of the
regulation applied and the complexity of the machine in issue
increases, so also do problems of efficacy and relevance.
Although OSHA represents an affirmation of the safety duty of
the factory-employer, the third-party defendant will probably be
foreclosed from relying on this. He is considered, under products
liability, to have a non-delegable duty to correct defects which cannot
be shifted upon the factory. This result seems consistent with the fact
that all other possible uses of OSHA in third-party suits are
evidentiary only, not conclusive. Plaintiff, however, may be able to
imply questions of duty based on the mere fact of OSHA's existence
where the doctrine of strict liability is straightforwardly applied.
With strict liability in issue, the mere introduction of safety codes
such as OSHA may expand the perception of a manufacturer's safety
duty. Safety codes, as a statement of new safety thinking, can provide
the standard for defining a machine's defectiveness or "unreasonable
danger" even if promulgated after manufacture. The absence of
"state of the art" or similar defenses and exclusionary rules, coupled
with a plaintiff's evidentiary use of OSHA regulations, may in effect
hold the manufacturer to a continuing duty of improving previously
manufactured machines. Any doubt about the far-reaching consequences of OSHA use in this context can be resolved by a close look at
the latest industrial litigation in the light of Ault v. International
Harvester.1'
OSHA may thus have a greater impact on the civil liability of
product manufacturers than it may have on the employer-factory's
liability. This anomalous result has not come about through a
conscious choice about which segment of society is best able to cure
196. See, e.g., Woltman v. Essick Mfg. Co., No. 236648 (Super. Ct. Calif., filed
July 24, 1975) (18 A.T.L.A. NEws L. 425, Nov. 1975). This was a strict liability
suit against a manufacturer of a mortar mixer allegedly without proper safety
guards. Later models of this mixer had such guards. Defendant claimed that addition
of the guards in later models was undertaken because of an attempted compliance with
OSHA regulations. Defendant's attempt to so improve his product, however, became
evidence supporting his liability. Following Ault, the court held for plaintiff, stating
that this -post-accident design improvement was evidence of the unreasonable danger
of the mortar mixer, which pre-dated OSHA. In light of Ault, it thus becomes obvious
that any distinction between the admission of subsequent design improvements and
subsequent safety codes would only be overly technical and illogical.
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industrial hazards and bear the losses resulting therefrom. Rather, it
has come because several creative developments in law occur at a
time when a major policy determinant is in a state of stagnation. The
creative developments include the fall of hearsay rationale as a bar to
safety code admission, the crossing of the privity barrier which
makes third-party suits possible, and the recognition that courts, not
industries, are the final judges of how far safety technologies will be
required to advance with relation to particular dangerous manufacturing arts. OSHA itself is a major creative development in the
field of industrial safety. Despite its flaws, it has the potential of
being molded into an effective tool for combatting industrial dangers
at the point an employee most directly can seek redress: within the
employer-employee relationship. At a time of several major legal
developments, the single overall policy determinant which has often
remained unchanged in this area is the law of workmen's compensation. Arbitrary statutory ceilings on recovery leave many injured
workers the third-party suit as the only means to full recovery.
The use of OSHA regulations can only make the changes and
clashes within current industrial policies more clear. A complex
regulatory scheme designed to prevent accidents may be used to
facilitate accident compensation in another context. Until there is a
major change in the public policy of industrial accident compensation, 197 however, the third-party suit will progressively become a
more difficult proposition for the manufacturers of industrial
machinery. Strict liability, which provides a streamlined route to the
manufacturer's legal responsibility, can now be coupled to the
definitions of machine dangers provided by OSHA and similar
codes.
197. One proposal for reform may be found in Mitchell, Products Liability,
Workmen's Compensation and the IndustrialAccident, 14 DuQ. L. REv. 349 (1976). In
addition to discussing the inadequacy of present compensation schemes, the author

argues that a possible remedy for Balido-type dangers to the manufacturer is an
expanded right of contribution against a negligent employer. The problem with this
feature of the plan is that perhaps the best way to evidence the employer's fault would

be to demonstrate his OSHA violations. If this were done, the employer's civil liability
would in a very real way be increased by OSHA. Such result seems an indirect but a
clear violation of 29 U.S.C. § 653(bX4) (1970).
Another idea is that of O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability:
Elective No-Fault Insurancefor Many Kinds of Injuries,60 MINN. L. REV. 501 (1976).
An underlying argument of this article is that most seriously injured persons are
primarily concerned with payment for out-of-pocket losses, not for pain and suffering.

Id. at 510.
Finally, the balanced appraisal offered by Chief Justice Traynor may be of some
value in considering reform proposals:

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol11/iss1/3

et al.: The Use of OSHA in Products Liability Suits Against the Manufactu

1976]

THE USE OF OSHA

Any system of enterprise liability or social insurance designed to replace
existing tort law as the means for compensating injured parties should
provide adequate but not undue compensation. Only if reasonably adequate
compensation is assured can the law justify closing traditional avenues of tort
recovery. On the other hand, once adequate compensation for economic loss
is assured, consideration might well be given to establishing curbs on such
potentially inflationary damages as those for pain and suffering. Otherwise
the cost of assured compensation could become prohibitive.
If in time the accident problem is solved through some compensation
scheme that covers the basic economic losses of accident victims, it will
remain to be seen whether the law of negligence as we know it today in this
area will atrophy or will survive in a diminished role to afford additional
compensation to victims whose injuries are caused by actual fault on the part
of others. Money damages, of course, can never really compensate for the
noneconomic losses resulting from personal injuries. Although it is therefore
reasonable to exclude such losses from coverage in any purely compensatory
system, inherent justice between the person injured and the person who
caused the injury may demand compensation for such losses when the latter
was actually at fault.
Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Productsand Strict Liability, 32 TENN.
L. REV. 363, 376 (1965).
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